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This article is based on materials presented at the 34th Annual
Conference of Developments in Intellectual Property Law at the
John Marshall Law School on February 22 and 23, 1990. The article
reviews the noteworthy trademark and unfair competition cases
published during the year prior to the Conference which explain,
change or confuse existing law.
It was an extremely important year for many reasons; most notably, the 1988 Trademark Revision Act 1 went into effect on November 16, 1989.2 The impact of the Revision Act on the various
subject areas of trademark and unfair competition law will be mentioned throughout this article.
I.

CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF TRADEMARK

A.

RIGHTS

Adoption and use

First and continuous use of a trademark in connection with
goods or services has long been the basis for establishing trademark
rights in this country. Perhaps the biggest structural change in
prior law which the Revision Act effected is the provision in section
1(c) that one now may apply for a federal registration based upon a
"bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce." '3 Once use in commerce is initiated, the intent to use applicant obtains a nationwide
constructive use date and prior use rights under section 7(c) as of
4
the application filing date.
"Use" is defined in section 45 of the Lanham Act as "the bona
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made
merely to reserve a right in a mark. ' 5 This new system is intended
to facilitate the protection of a selected trademark during the often
lengthy process of developing and bringing a new product to market, and to eliminate the common commercial practice of making
early token shipments to establish priority rights.
It remains to be seen what practical effect the intent to use revision will have. We do know that over 3300 applications to register
were filed on November 16, 1989, with approximately 2400 of them
being intent-based. This is in contrast to the previous average of
approximately 300 applications per day in the Patent and Trademark Office. Fittingly, the first intent-to-use application filed was
6
for the mark PERESTROIKA.
1. Trademark Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. Id. at § 136.

3.
4.
5.
6.
1989).

15
15
15
39

U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1988).
U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988).
U.S.C. § 1127 (1988)
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA), No. 961, at 159 (Dec. 21,
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While intent to use applications ultimately may have a
profound effect on how trademark rights are developed and protected in this country, an intent to use applicant's rights are still
subject to another's rights where use prior to the application is established. 7 Furthermore, many trademark and unfair competition
disputes will continue to be decided, in the absence of registration,
on a common law basis.8 Therefore, the principle that first and continuous use creates protectable trademark rights continues to be
valid. What constitutes adequate "use," however, has been the subject of much litigation, and that question again faced the Patent and
Trademark Office and courts in 1989.
Pre-sales publicity may under certain circumstances suffice to
establish common law priority of use. In Novel ID v. Hyman Products Inc.,9 plaintiff had used the mark STRESS BALL at a trade
show on packaging and on promotional displays in proximity to the
product, a novelty gift ball, although not on the ball itself. Defendant subsequently used the mark STRESS BREAKER on a very
similar product. On plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction,
the court found that plaintiff had received a large amount of publicity for its product prior to defendant's first use, and that plaintiff's
pre-sale marketing activities "could arguably have been sufficient
to have created an identification between the trademark and product in the minds of the public." 10 It concluded that plaintiff had a
protectable common law trademark right in the STRESS BALL
mark." In granting plaintiff's motion, the court noted that both
products were new and that monetary damages would be very spec12
ulative in the absence of any quantifiable sales success.
Person'sCo. v. (3Tristman13 presented an unusual priority decision in which petitioner, a Japanese corporation, sought to cancel
Christman's registration of PERSON'S for wearing apparel, claiming priority based upon use of PERSON'S in Japan. Christman had
seen Person's products in Japan and decided to market the same
products under the same marks in the United States. 14 The Board
rejected Person's priority claim because its foreign use did not have
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988).
8. Health Indus., Inc. v. European Health Spas, 489 F. Supp. 860 (D.S.D.
1980) (a mark is a property right based on common law); Koffler Stores, Ltd. v.
Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mich. 1976), qff'd, 559 F.2d
1219 (6th Cir. 1977) (trademark law is part of broader law of unfair
competition).

9. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
10. Id. at 1141.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 1143.
13. 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1477 (T.T.A.B. 1988), aff'd, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
14. Id. at 1479.
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the requisite "effect on U.S. commerce," and the mark was insufficiently famous for protection under the Paris convention. 15 The
Board noted that a showing of "bad faith" on Christman's part required more than just copying; since Person's mark had no reputation or goodwill here, Christman could not be said to have intended,
6
in bad faith, to trade on that reputation or goodwill.'
Alleged token use was at issue in Wallace Computer Services,
Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc. 17 In this trademark infringement action, Wallace sought to cancel Sun's registration of TOPS for computer equipment on the grounds that Sun's first use was a sham
transaction and not for the same product in connection with which
the registered mark was ultimately used.' 8 In denying both parties'
summary judgment motions, the court held that the fact that the
trademark owner solicited his first customer, a friend, to purchase
the product did not invalidate the initial interstate use of the
mark. 1 9 Evidence of payment for the transaction, the court ruled,
also was not necessary since transportation in interstate commerce
is sufficient "use in commerce" to satisfy the statutory
20
requirements.
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the product eventually
marketed differed from the product initially shipped, the court
noted that as long as the goods in the initial shipment possessed
"the inherent and identifiable character" of the later product, the
use was valid, citing Ralston Purina Co. v. On-Car Frozen Foods,
Inc.21 This standard was developed to allow business owners to protect their substantial investments by relying on use early on in the
development of a product rather than having to wait until product
22
completion to secure priority.
How might this case be decided under the Revision Act? Some
have argued that the transportation of a prototype computer to a
friend for evaluation could be bona fide use in commerce, even
though part of the purpose of the transaction was to establish, or,
perhaps, "reserve" a right in a trademark. Such an evaluation or
test market could be activity in the ordinary course of trade vis-avis the marketing of computers and, therefore, not use made
"merely to reserve a right." Also, under the new definition of use,
as under the old, a sale is not a prerequisite to valid use. Transpor15. Id. at 1480.
16. Id. at 1480-81.
17. 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
18. Id. at 1325.
19. Id. at 1326-27.
20. Id. at 1327.
21. Wallace, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. See Ralston Purina Co. v. OnCor Frozen Foods, Inc., 746 F.2d 801, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 979 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

22. Id.
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tation of a product will suffice. Finally, nothing in the new Act necessarily affects the Ralston-Purina "inherent and identifiable
character" test. It is quite possible, therefore, that we will continue
to see litigated token use issues, or "use analogous to token use"
issues, even under the new Act.23
B. Distinctive,suggestive and descriptive terms
Courts traditionally have used certain analytical categories to
classify trademark types. A generic term, consisting of the language name of the product itself, for example, "chair" for a chair, is
unregistrable and normally unprotectable.24 A descriptive mark is
not registrable or protectable unless it is shown to have acquired
secondary meaning, i.e., source-indicating significance. 25 A term is
descriptive if it immediately conveys the idea of the ingredients,
qualities or characteristics of the goods to the consumer. 26 An example would be TENDER VITTLES for cat food. Pictures, or aspects of trade dress may be considered descriptive as well. A
suggestive mark, which suggests what the product is without actually being descriptive of it, for example, STRONGHOLD for nails,
is registrable and protectable without any showing of secondary
meaning.2 (The line drawn by the courts between descriptive and
suggestive terms concededly is a fine one). Arbitrary or fanciful
marks, like OLD CROW for whiskey or FAB for detergent, having
no suggestive or descriptive connection with the product, and
coined marks, like EXXON or KODAK, which have no meaning
other than as a trademark, also need no proof of secondary
28
meaning.
In Echo Travel Inc. v. Travel Associates Inc.,29 defendant alleg23. Other significant prior use decisions include Flatley v. Trump, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1284, 1289 (T.T.A.B. 1989), where the respondent, Donald
Trump, unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the peti-

tioner lacked prior common law rights in the mark THE CASTLE, the Board
holding that prior use in connection with a product or service in a manner
"analogous to trademark or service mark use," (here, in promotional materials)
may be sufficient to establish rights; Power Play Boats, Inc. v. Power Play
Marine, Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1792 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (denial of summary
judgment on issue of priority as defendant's prior handwritten use of the mark
on invoices could constitute use in commerce); Malcolm Nicol & Co., Inc. v.
Witco Corp., 881 F.2d 1063), 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1638 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (cancel-

lation of BRITOL registration for mineral oil upheld where petitioner's priority
established by the testimony of two long time officers, a shipping invoice for a
free sample, product guides and promotional literature dating back 14 years).
24. See B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLUARD, TRADEMARKS § 2.04 (1987) for a discussion of distinctive, suggestive and descriptive terms.
25. Id.

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 870 F.2d 1264, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1368 (7th Cir. 1989).
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edly attempted to pass off its vacation tour services as those of
plaintiff, by distributing a promotional poster substantially identical to a poster used by plaintiff. The district court granted defendant summary judgment, holding that the poster, depicting a beach
scene, was merely descriptive of vacation services and had not acquired secondary meaning. 3°
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 3 1 Evidence that approximately
25,000 beach scene posters were disseminated on 200 college campuses failed to establish that the poster had acquired a secondary
meaning identifying plaintiff as a source of spring break tours. 32
The lower court had not erred in limiting the relevant consumer
class to college students, since plaintiff continually referred to this
group in connection with its tours. 33 The fact that the poster was
only used for one "season" from fall to winter also undercut plaintiff's ability to demonstrate secondary meaning. 34 Finally, the circuit court also noted the absence of any direct consumer evidence,
such as a survey.35
36
In G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
Anheuser-Busch argued that the district court erred in holding that
the initials of descriptive words are inherently descriptive and that
the mark LA therefore was merely descriptive for low alcohol beer.
In affirming the lower court's holding for Heileman, the Seventh
Circuit opined that there is a natural assumption that initials do
generally stand for something, and ordinarily, no operation of the
imagination is required to convey that initials stand for descriptive
words. 37 Fashioning a new test for the protection of initials, the
court held that there is a presumption that to the public initials
mean, or will soon come to mean, the descriptive phrase from which
they are derived.3 8 A party seeking protection for the initials of a
39
descriptive term has the burden of rebutting that presumption.
This represents a compromise between the positions of those courts
which had previously held initial marks to be arbitrary or sugges4°
tive and those courts which had held such marks to be generic.
30. Id. at 1265, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1269, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
33. Id. at 1267, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
34. Id. at 1268-69, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
35. Id. at 1267-68, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371-72.
36. 873 F.2d 985, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (7th Cir. 1989).
37. Id. at 994, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808-09.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Other descriptiveness cases of interest include: Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 722 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Fla. 1989), where the court summarily held that plaintiff's mark, INVESTACORP for financial services, was
descriptive and the plaintiff's sales and advertising evidence, including sales to-
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Geographical terms

The number of geographical terms applicable to a given locality
is limited, and such terms are commonly used for trade identity
purposes. In determining the scope of protection, if any, to be accorded a geographical mark, the public interest in having its use
available to all residents of the locality must be balanced against the
prior user's right to protection of the goodwill it has developed in
the mark.41 Where secondary meaning has attached, a non-deceptive geographical term is protectable and may be federally
registered. 42
Geographic marks can be divided into four basic categories: (1)
geographic marks which are not "primarily. geographically descriptive," because the geographic meaning is minor, obscure, remote or
unconnected with the goods, examples being HYDE PARK for
clothing, ANTARTICA for soft drinks, and DUTCH BOY for paint;
(2) marks which are "primarily geographically descriptive," because
the public would associate the goods with the identified place and
be right, an example being DENVER WESTERNS for westernstyle shirts manufactured there; (3) marks which are "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" because the public would
make a goods/place association and be wrong, but the misdescription would not be material to the purchase, an example being CAMBRIDGE for Florida oranges; and (4) geographic marks which are
deceptive because the public would make a goods/place association
and be wrong, and the misdescription would be material to the
purchase, an example being PARIS for perfume made in New
Jersey. Category (1) needs no proof of secondary meaning; categories (2) and (3) need such proof for protection and registration; and
43
category (4) is unregistrable and normally unprotectable.
These trademark principles can be difficult for an experienced
practitioner to sort through, and a recent Sixth Circuit decision
demonstrates the difficulty courts often have understanding them.
tailing $27 million in less than five years, was insufficient to establish secondary
meaning, specifically noting the lack of a survey or other direct evidence of secondary meaning; In re Associated Theatre Clubs Co., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1660

(T.T.A.B. 1988) where GROUP SALES BOX OFFICE for theater ticket sales
services was refused registration as merely a combination of two descriptive
terms that had not become distinctive of applicant's services; Syrelec v. Pass &
Seymour, Inc., 869 F.2d 838, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (5th Cir. 1989), affirming
cancellation based on likely confusion between registrant's SYRELEC mark
and petitioner's trade name Syracuse Electronics, (abbreviated as Syr.Elec.),

both for electronic services. The court rejected registrant's contention that petitioner had the burden to prove secondary meaning in the abbreviation, finding
the abbreviation neither descriptive nor commonly used. Id. at 1480.
41. See B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLiARD, supra note 24, at § 2.05 for a discussion of geographical terms.

42. Id.
43. Id.
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In Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc.,"
the appellate court affirmed the lower court's holding that the
mark APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES was primarily geographically descriptive and not distinctive and therefore, not infringed by defendant's mark APPALACHIAN LOG HOMES. In
the case, there were two basic questions: (1) was plaintiff's mark
APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES primarily geographically
descriptive of log homes manufactured in Virginia (a part of the
geographic region known as Appalachia); and (2) if so, did it obtain
secondary meaning before defendant began using the mark APPA45
LACHIAN LOG HOMES.
In its initial analysis, the court made the unusual observation
that "[u]se of a geographic term such as . .. WORLD to describe
carpets... is entirely arbitrary. The protected mark [WORLD) has
no relationship to the source of goods since none of the goods were
manufactured in the geographic area described." 4 If the carpets
were not manufactured in the world, one wonders where they were
manufactured. In the end, however, the court reasonably concluded that a challenging defendant need not demonstrate that the
geographical area at issue is noted for the goods in question, and
affirmed the holding that a goods/place association was made by
plaintiff's mark regardless of whether the area was noted for log
47
cabins, and that the mark was, therefore, descriptive.
As to secondary meaning, the court declined to rely on a PTO
finding that plaintiff's two year period of use with $2,000,000 in
gross sales and $100,000 in advertising expenditures was sufficient
to establish secondary meaning. 48 The court's majority found the
fact that plaintiff had only used its mark for twenty months before
defendant began to use the mark APPALACHIAN LOG HOMES
sufficient to rebut the PTO's finding.49 The dissent thought "convincing proof" should be necessary to rebut a PTO finding, and that
5°
the cited evidence was insufficient.
In In re Jacques Bernier,Inc.,51 the Board had refused to register the mark RODEO DRIVE for perfume on the grounds the mark
was primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive. The
Board had found that Rodeo Drive in Beverly Hills is "a geographic
location which is well known for expensive stores selling costly con871 F.2d 590, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
Id.
Id. at 594, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
Id. at 595, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
Id. at 595-96, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
49. Id. at 596, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
50. Id. at 598, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

1443 (6th Cir. 1989).
1445.
1446.
at 1446-47.
1447.
1448-49.

51. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1955 (T.T.A.B. 1989), rev'd, 894 F.2d 389, 13

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1725 (Fed.Cir. 1990).
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sumer items such as clothing, perfume and jewelry to a wealthy
chic and/or famous clientele," and that applicant's perfume admittedly was not manufactured, produced or sold there.5 2 The appellate court reversed, finding no evidence in the record that people
would believe that applicant's perfume originated on Rodeo Drive
53
in Beverly Hills.

D. Surnames
As with geographical marks, the courts and the Patent and
Trademark Office recognize the public interest in allowing people
to use their own surnames in connection with their business. Surnames therefore are not ordinarily registrable or protectable unless
5
secondary meaning is demonstrated.m
In Yankelovich, Skelly and White v. White, Yankelovich,
Skelly Consulting Group, Inc., 5 defendants made millions when
they sold their first market research business and the right to use of
their names. When they tried to get back into competition with
their former business under a slightly revised version of their old
name, they were preliminarily enjoined.m The court rejected their
argument that they should be able to use their own names, citing
Cervantes' observation that "a good name is better than great
riches. '5 7 The court then set out the correct proposition that one
can use one's own name only if it does not create a likelihood of
52. Id.
53. Id.

In In re Biesseci S.p.A., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149 (T.T.A.B. 1989),

the applicant, an Italian clothing manufacturer, attempted to register AMERICAN SYSTEM and Design for men's and women's clothing. The Board found
the mark deceptive because clothing is manufactured in the U.S., "buying
American" is now important to the public, and the public would likely believe
erroneously that applicant's goods originated here. Id. at 1150-51. A similar result was reached in In re Perry Mfg. Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751 (T.T.A.B.
1989), where applicant sought to register PERRY NEW YORK and Design for
women's clothing. The Board affirmed the Examiner's refusal of registration
on the ground that applicant was located in North Carolina, making the mark
deceptive. Id. at 1752. Since New York is a world-renowned center of fashion,
people would believe that applicant's clothes originated there. In In re California Pizza Kitchen, Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704 (T.T.A.B. 1989), applicant
appealed from the Examiner's refusal to register CALIFORNIA PIZZA
KITCHEN for restaurant services. The Board held that the primary significance of "CALIFORNIA" was geographical, rather than describing a particular
cooking style, and affirmed the Examiner's finding that consumers would believe that applicant's services originated in California. Id. at 1706-07. That applicant's restaurant services were rendered both within and outside of
California did not warrant a finding that public would not associate those services with California. Id. at 1706.
54. See B. PATrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 2.06 for a discussion of surnames.
55. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
56. Id. at 1387-90.
57. Id. at 1386.

1990]

Developments in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law

11

confusion.ss In this case, evidence of actual confusion and intent
supported the court's decision to enjoin the use. As a remedy, the
court did allow defendants' use of the name with a proper disclaimer. 59 In a similar case, Sears Roebuck v. Charles Win Sears
Real Estate,60 the defendant was not allowed to use his name
SEARS alone for his real estate business, but had to use his full
name, Charles W. Sears.6 x
E.

Colors

The general rule formerly was that color was accorded trademark protection only when employed as an element of distinctive
design, the concern being the limited number of colors available.62
In allowing registration of the color pink for insulation in In re
Owens-CorningFiberglasCorp.," however, the Federal Circuit recognized that a non-functional color which has acquired secondary
meaning for a particular product and "does not deprive competitors
of a reasonable right or a competitive need" should be registrable
and protectable without reference to a design.e 4
In Keds Corp. v. Renee InternationalTrading Corp.,65 defendant appealed a preliminary injunction against its use of a blue rectangle label on its canvas sneakers, arguing that the label was
functional. The court rejected this argument, finding the label's
only "function" was to identify the product.66 Given Keds' incontestable registration in the blue rectangle label, and the similarity
of the products and their distribution, the court declined to overturn the injunction.6 7 The court also dismissed Renee's argument
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1387-90.
60. No. 86-CV-1142 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
61. In Emilio Pucci Societa a Responsibilita Limitata v. Pucci Corp., 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1541 (N.D. Ill. 1988), the court held that plaintiff's mark
EMILIO PUCCI had acquired secondary meaning and defendant's use of
PUCCI was likely to cause consumer confusion. However, it found that "defendant may have a statutory prior use defense with respect to the Chicago metropolitan area." Id. at 1545. The court ordered defendant to use both his first
and last name in all advertising anywhere outside of Chicago and to disclaim
any connection to Emilio Pucci. Id. The examiner's refusal to register CECIL
ADAMS, a fictitious name used as a byline for a collectively authored column,
was appealed in In re Chicago Reader, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079 (T.T.A.B.
1989). Noting that pseudonyms are not generally regarded as serving a trademark purpose, the Board affirmed, finding that CECIL ADAMS was not being
used as an indication of source, but merely to identify the author. Id. at 1080.
62. See B. PATrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 2.07 for a discussion of trademark protection of colors.
63. 774 F.2d 1116, 227 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 417 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
64. Id. at 1122, 227 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 421.
65. 888 F.2d 215, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1808 (1st Cir. 1989).
66. Id. at 221, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
67. Id. at 222, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813.
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that the color blue was non-registrable, noting that Keds combined
the color with a distinctive design and that the "color depletion theory" was somewhat out of date.6 8
II.

TRADEMARK REGISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS

A.

The benefits offederal registration

The benefits that accrue from federal registration include:
(1) constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership of the
mark, section 22 of the Lanham Act;6 9 (2) nationwide constructive
use as of the date of application, section 7(c); 70 (3) prima facie evidence of the registration's validity, the registrant's ownership of the
mark, and the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce on the goods or services specified in the registration certificate, section 7(b);7 1 (4) the right to institute a trademark action in
federal courts without regard to diversity of citizenship or the
amount in controversy, section 39;72 (5) the right to request customs
officials to bar the importation of goods bearing infringing trademarks, section 42; 7 3 (6) provision for treble damages, attorneys' fees
and other remedies in civil actions for infringement, sections 3438;74 and (7) the right, after continuous use of the mark for five
years after registration, to have the registration become incontestable and thereby constitute conclusive evidence of registrant's right
to use the mark in commerce for the identified goods or services,
subject to certain defenses enumerated in section 33(b) including
fraud, abandonment, misrepresentation, prior use, use in violation
75
of antitrust laws and fair use.
An important result of the Revision Act enactment was to resolve the previous debate as to whether equitable challenges not
specifically enumerated in section 33(b) are available against an incontestable registration. 76 The Revision Act now expressly pro77
vides that they are.
68. Id. at 221, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.

69. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1988).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1988).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988)
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1120 (1988).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988). See, e.g., Pucci Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1541
(N.D. Ill. 1988); Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1226 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 202 (1989) (the Ninth Circuit
holding that laches is a valid defense in an action involving an incontestable
registration).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8) (1988).
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There is a split of authority on whether incontestability mandates a finding that a mark is strong. In Majorica, S.A. v. Majorca
International,Ltd.,78 where plaintiff owned an incontestable registration of MAJORICA for jewelry, the court denied plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's affirmative defenses, holding that Park 'N
Fly, Inc. v. DollarPark & Fly, Inc., 79 does not preclude attacks on
the strength or scope of protection of an incontestably registered
mark.

In Dieter v. B & H Industriesof Southwest Florida,Inc.,80 the
lower court had concluded that Dieter's mark SHUTTERWORLD
for "pre-hung wooden shutter assemblies" was merely descriptive
and thus, a relatively weak mark despite its incontestable status. It
relied upon Source Services Corp. v. ChicagolandJobsource, Inc.,S1
which held that validity and likelihood of confusion are distinct inquiries and the incontestable status of a registration has no bearing
on the likelihood of confusion analysis.8 2 On appeal, Dieter argued
this was tantamount to requiring proof of secondary meaning de83
spite incontestable rights.
The Eleventh Circuit found that the trial court's analysis did
not require Dieter to prove secondary meaning in order to enforce
its incontestable rights, and that Park 'N Fly left open the question
of whether incontestable affects the strength of the mark for purposes of determining likelihood of confusion. s The appellate court,
however, declined to follow Source Services, expressly holding that
incontestability is a factor to be considered in determining likelihood of confusion.8 5 Because the registration at issue had become
incontestable, the mark was presumed to be at least descriptive
with secondary meaning and thus, a relatively strong mark.86 Com87
pare the 1988 Sixth Circuit decision, Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas,
where the court held that defendant was precluded from relitigating "the original strength or weakness" of plaintiff's incontestably
registered mark CLASSIC for hair care products, and that such an
incontestably registered mark "must be considered strong and worthy of full protection."8 8
78. 687 F. Supp. 92, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1872 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
79. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
80. 683 F. Supp. 1345 (M.D. Fla. 1988), rev'd, 880 F.2d 322 (11th Cir. 1989).
81. 643 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Ill.
1986).

82.
83.
111 S.
84.
85.
86.

Dieter, 683 F. Supp. at 1355 n.7.
880 F.2d 322, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 17212 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
Ct. 369 (1990).
Id. at 328, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726.
Id. at 328-29, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
Id.

87. 839 F.2d 1183, 1187, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1944, 1946 (6th Cir. 1988).

88. Id.
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The court found plaintiff's incontestable rights did not extend
to goods not identified in the registration and denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction in Galaxy Chemical Co. v. BASF
Corp.8 9 Plaintiff used the mark GALAXY for a root killer in sewers and pipes and defendant used the same mark for a soybean herbicide. 9° Plaintiff's incontestable registration did not cover
herbicides and plaintiff had never used the mark for a soybean herbicide.91 The court, therefore, found plaintiff's incontestable rights
did not encompass defendant's type of product. 92 The court also
noted that the wide variety of products for which the mark GALAXY is registered made the mark "far from strong."9 3
B. Acquisition and maintenance of federal registrations
Federal registration of a trademark on the Principal Register is
obtained by filing a verified written application with the Trademark
Division of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, accompanied by a drawing of the mark, specimens, labels or facsimiles of
the mark as actually used, and the statutory filing fee.9 4 A mark
which is "capable of distinguishing applicant's goods or services and
not registrable on the principal register" may be registered on the
Supplemental Register.95
Descriptive marks are registrable on the Principal Register if
they have acquired distinctiveness (i.e. secondary meaning). 96
Under the Revision Act, the Commissioner may accept as prima facie evidence of distinctiveness (e.g. by affidavit) substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce of the mark during the five
years preceding the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is
made. 97
As mentioned above, the Revision Act's most significant change
over prior trademark registration practice is to provide for applications based on bonafuie intent to use a mark in commerce. A party
has six months from allowance of an intent to use application to
begin actual use (which may be extended up to an additional 30
months upon good cause), and, upon registration, nationwide constructive use exists from the date the application is filed.98 The Revision Act also reduced the term of registration from twenty years
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (N.D. Iil. 1989).
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1281.
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988).
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988).
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to ten years to reduce "deadwood." 99
The question of what constitutes a registrable "service" arose
in In re Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America Inc.,i°° where the Board
reversed a refusal of registration for the mark DIAMOND CARE
and Design for automotive vehicle preparation, sales and service
programs. The examining attorney had found that the services offered did not differ from the primary activity of selling a new car
and so did not constitute a separate "service" under the Lanham
Act.' 0 ' The Board found that the following extra services were offered under DIAMOND CARE and Design were more than just
normal "dealer prep" as found by the examining attorney: (1) a full
tank of gas, (2) a video cassette used to train dealers in the provision
of quality assurance services, (3) audio cassettes provided to customers which contain instructions in the use of the automobile, (4) personalized, unsolicited telephone calls to every customer, (5) periodic
news letters, (6) an optional comprehensive 1,000 mile evaluation of
the car's performance, independent of warranty repairs.' 0 2 The
Board concluded that the evidence did not support the Examining
Attorney's position that "applicant's services are no more than are
to be expected from any other car dealer."' 0 3 The Board further
noted that registrable services under the statute can be ancillary to
i 4
a primary activity.1
C. Federal administrativeproceedings
The Board has been strict in the past regarding proposed
amendments of an application during Board proceedings, but the
Revision Act authorizes amendment of trademark applications and
registrations during Board proceedings to clarify or limit the scope
of goods or services.' 05 In countering a refusal to register, an applicant also may be permitted to amend its application to obviate confusion if the amendment does not materially alter the mark or if
the applicant seeks to add a mark to the applied for mark, and already owns a registration of the mark sought to be added for the
i 6
same goods as those listed in the application.1
Concurrent use registrations may be obtained where two or
more parties concurrently use the same or similar marks in distinct
territories such that their respective uses do not create a likelihood
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (1988).
100. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1312 (T.T.A.B. 1989).
101. Id. at 1313.
102. Id. at 1313-15.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1314.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1062(b) (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 2.71(b) (1990).
106. In re Nationwide, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882, 1885 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (interpreting 37 C.F.R. § 2.72).
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of confusion.' 0 7 In Pinocchio'sPizza, Inc. v. Sandra,Inc.,1's an application converted into a concurrent use proceeding, the registrant
of the mark PINNOCHIO'S for restaurant services operated one
small restaurant in Maryland with no plans for expansion. Applicant, a remote prior user, used virtually the same mark, PINNOCHIOS without the apostrophe, in connection with ten larger
restaurants in Texas, and had plans to expand to two other
states. 10 9 The court granted a concurrent use registration to applicant nationwide except for the state of Maryland and a fifty mile
square radius around registrant's restaurant, which might include
areas outside of Maryland."i0
III.

Loss OF RIGHTS

A.

Generic marks

A mark which is only a generic term for an item cannot be registered and generally cannot be protected."' The Revision Act officially changes the denomination of this category of marks from
"common descriptive name" to "generic. 1" 2
Each year yields new decisions by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and the courts declaring purported trademarks generic.
In Murphy Door Bed Co. v. InteriorSleep Systems, Inc.,i"3 Murphy
sued an ex-distributor for selling wall beds under the mark MURPHY BED. Murphy's application to register MURPHY BED, based
on nearly eighty years of use, twice had been refused by the
T.T.A.B. on the ground of genericness. Despite the T.T.A.B.'s findings, the district court held MURPHY BED was not generic and
had acquired secondary meaning, noting only one competitor
14
It
(among many) used MURPHY BED as a name for the goods.
permanently enjoined defendant's use of MURPHY BED and
awarded plaintiff over $820,000 in profits and punitive damages."15
On appeal the Second Circuit held that the T.T.A.B.'s genericness ruling should have been accorded great weight, and that the
inclusion of MURPHYBED in many dictionaries as "a standard description of a wall-bed," as well as numerous examples of use of the
term in newspapers and magazines to describe a type of bed, all
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227 (T.T.A.B. 1989).
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1229.
B. PATriSHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 4.02.
15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988).
687 F. Supp. 754, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1541 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part

and rev'd in part,874 F.2d 95, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1748 (2d Cir. 1989).
114. Id. at 759-61.
115. 874 F.2d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1989).
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warranted a finding that MURPHY BED was generic.1 1 6 Its holding of no trademark infringement, however, did not foreclose the
broader unfair competition claim.117 The court found that defendant's invoice description of its beds as MURPHY BEDS, using plaintiff's style numbers, and its advertisements referring to its products
as "Original" constituted intentional passing off. 1 18 It also upheld
the permanent injunction against use of MURPHY BED under a
contract theory, because defendant had agreed to cease such use
upon termination of the distribution agreement. 119 The case was
then remanded for a reformulation of damages.
Of interest in the MURPHY BED case was the court's discussion of who bears the burden of proof in genericness cases. The
district court had put the burden on defendant and found it not
met. 120 The appellate court explained that the burden of proof depends on the origin of the term in question. 12 1 If a mark is in effect
invented for use in connection with a product (examples being aspirin, thermos and cellophane), and it is asserted that the public has
expropriated the mark for generic use, the burden properly is on
the party claiming the mark has become generic. 122 It stated, "[t]his
presumption of nongenericness of a product name in the case of apparent public expropriation is justified by the commercial protection a developer of innovations deserves.' 123 In this case, although
MURPHY is a surname and not a coined word, plaintiff was the
first to use it in connection with wall beds. 124 Since the claim was
that the public had expropriated the mark and made it generic, the
burden was on defendant. 125 If the mark in question had been in
common use by the public in connection with the goods before the
plaintiff developed his product and applied the mark to it, the burden would be on plaintiff.' 26 The court used the mark VIDEO
127
BUYER'S GUIDE as an example.
In Dial-A-MattressFranchiseCorp. v. Page,128 plaintiff owned a
local telephone number for his mattress business which spelled MA-T-T-R-E-S-S. Defendant later acquired 1-800-M-A-T-T-R-E-S-S
for his mattress business. The court upheld an order that prelimi116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id.
Id. at 102-03.
Id. at 100-01.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
880 F.2d 675, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1644 (2d Cir. 1989).
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narily enjoined defendant from using the 800 number in the New
York metropolitan area, and required defendant to notify the telephone company not to connect up any phone calls originating from
that area. 1 29 While agreeing that the term "mattress" was generic,
the court stated "[t]elephone numbers may be protected as trademarks, and a competitor's use of a confusingly similar number may
be enjoined as both trademark infringement and unfair
30
competition."
In another telephone number case,' 31 defendant was enjoined
from advertising that its 800 telephone number spelled L-A-W-Y-ER-S or using the word LAWYERS in connection with the word
DIAL for legal services, based upon plaintiff's prior use of L-A-WY-E-R-S as his local number and his incontestable registration of
DIAL L-A-W-Y-E-R-S.
In Burger King Corp. v. Pilgrim'sPride Corp., 1 32 Burger King
obtained a jury verdict against Pilgrim's Pride, holding that defendant's use of CHICKEN TENDERS and CHICKEN BREAST TENDERS infringed Burger King's prior use of the mark CHICKEN
TENDERS on its chicken product. In denying Pilgrim's Pride's motion for judgment n.o.v., the court rejected its contention that
CHICKEN TENDERS was generic. 133 Although there was some
evidence of genericness in the poultry industry, the term was dis3 4
tinctive with respect to the general public.1
In considering defendant's counterclaim that RUFFLES is ge135
neric for potato chips in Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Company,
the court noted that defendant had "offered no proof of widespread,
as distinguished from fairly scattered, consumer use of 'ruffles' as a
generic term for food in general or for potato chips in particular,
even though the mark has been in use for potato chips for over
thirty years.' 136 Due to plaintiff's policing measures, defendant
also could show no widespread industry use. Defendant's summary
3 7
motion on its counterclaim was denied.1
129. Id. at 676-77, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.

130. Id. at 678, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
131. Murrin v. Midco Communications, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1195, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1815 (D.C. Minn. 1989).
132. 705 F. Supp. 1522, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1988), qff'd, 894
F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1990).

133. Id. at 1525-26, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528-29.
134. Id. at 1525.
135. 704 F. Supp. 432, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
136. Id. at 440, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
137. Id. Other cases of related interest include: Sebastian International, Inc.
v. Hask Toiletries, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2008 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (the Board
finding "spritz" generic in the hair care industry, cancelled opposer's registra-

tion of SPHRITZ for hair spray, and dismissed the opposition to STIFF SPRITZ
for hair conditioner); General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v.

Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
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Abandonment

A mark is abandoned when use has been discontinued with intent not to resume. 138 Nonuse of a registered mark for two consec13 9
utive years constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.

Ferrari S.p.A. Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili E Corse v.
McBurnie Coachcraft,Inc.,140 raises the issue of whether residual
goodwill in abandoned marks may be protected. Plaintiff alleged
defendant infringed the protectable body style of its Ferrari Day14
tona Spider via defendant's manufactured "replica" of that car. '
Defendant moved for summary judgment that, even if plaintiff's
Daytona Spider body was protectable as trade dress, plaintiff had

abandoned its rights.142 Despite plaintiff having ceased production
over 13 years earlier, with no intent to resume production, the court
denied defendant's motion. 143 It found plaintiff's evidence of continued goodwill associated with the vehicle and ongoing parts support, "[i]f true, . . . could be sufficient" to establish nonabandonment.'"
In Board of Governors of University of North Carolinav. Helpingstine,145 plaintiff had introduced a licensing program in 1982 and

registered its marks, including the University Seal Design, UNC,
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA and the Tarheel Foot Design. Defendant defended its use of plaintiff's marks on t-shirts and
clothing by claiming plaintiff had abandoned its rights by its previous failure to prosecute infringers or license its marks. 14 The court
found no abandonment because "it is clear that UNC-CH's marks
(BNA) 1491 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1134 (1990) (reversing judgment on the pleadings for plaintiff in light of defense that SEVENTH DAY
ADVENTIST refers to set of beliefs, not an organization, and is therefore generic); Best Buy Warehouse v. Best Buy Co., Inc., No. 88-1201-CV-W-5 (W.D.
Mo., Nov. 27, 1989)(LEXIS, Patcop library, T.T.A.B. file)(BEST BUY generic
for retail store services); Transfer Print Foils, Inc. v. Transfer Print America,
Inc., 720 F. Supp. 425, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1753 (D.N.J. 1989) (TRANSFER
PRINT not generic for surface decorating machines and services); AFP Imaging
Corp. v. Photo-Therm, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534 (D.N.J. 1989) (the court
finding that AFP was not generic for automatic film processing equipment, that
it had considerable secondary meaning attached to it, and that defendant's
change from AFP to "Model AFP-1" did not substantially alter the likelihood of
confusion, so that preliminary relief was warranted).
138. See B. PArrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 4.03 for a discussion of abandonment.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
140. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1278 (S.D. Cal. 1988), laterproceeding,11 U.S.P.Q.
2d (BNA) 1843 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
141. Id. at 1280.
142. Id. at 1282.
143. Id
144. Id.
145. 714 F. Supp. 167, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
146. Id. at 170-71, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1509.
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would still be regarded by the public as having originated with the
University. It is also relevant that the University has never discontinued its use of the marks, for continuous use indicates a lack of
intent to abandon."'1 47 The court, however, denied summary judgment to both parties, finding the likelihood of confusion evidence
14
insufficient.
The Federal Circuit recently analyzed the relative burdens of
proof and production of evidence for abandonment allegations in a
cancellation proceeding. In Cerveceria Centroamericana, S.A. v.
Cerveceria India, Inc.,149 respondent defended a cancellation proceeding by introducing evidence of plaintiff's non-use of
MEDALLO DE ORO for beer between 1977 and 1986. Once prima
facie abandonment has been established, the court ruled, only the
burden to produce some rebuttal evidence shifts to the registrant,
not the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion.i s ° If the registrant can offer sufficient rebuttal evidence, the
party seeking cancellation must then persuade the fact finder that
15 1
despite registrant's evidence, the mark has been abandoned.
Plaintiff's rebuttal evidence, however, including testimony that the
beer was for sale "probably in 1978" and that plaintiff had begun to
plan reintroduction in the U.S. by 1984, was held insufficient to
overcome the abandonment presumption, and the registration was
152
cancelled.
C. Assignment without goodwill
An assignment of a trademark without the goodwill of the business associated with it results in an abandonment of rights. 5 3 In
154
Main Street Outfitters,Inc. v. FederatedDepartmentStores, Inc.,
defendant was assigned the mark MAIN STREET for clothing by
Work Wear Corporation for $62,000. Although no tangible assets
were transferred, the agreement recited that all the goodwill attached to the mark was assigned1x 5 In rejecting plaintiff's abandonment claim, the court held the assignment valid, because the
defendant was using the mark on essentially the same goods as the
assignor, namely clothing, the parties intended to transfer all good147. Id. at 171, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 173, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
892 F.2d 1021, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1025-26, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311-12.
Id. at 1026-27, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312-13.
Id. at 1027, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
See B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 4.04 for a discus-

sion of assignment without goodwill.

154. 730 F. Supp. 289, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (D. Minn. 1989).
155. Id. at 290, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
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will associated with the mark, and the public was not deceived.1 5
D.

Licensing in gross

Licensing a trademark in gross, whereby the trademark owner

does not control the quality of the licensed goods, can result in
abandonment of rights as well.1 57 In Midwest Plastic Fabricators,
Inc. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.,i 58 petitioner, Midwest

Plastic Fabricators, manufactured electrical equipment certified by
respondent UL. Petitioner offered extensive evidence that UL had
not adequately policed the quality of products sold by two of petitioner's competitors, and moved to cancel UL's certification
mark. 59 In denying cancellation, the Board held UL had exercised
"considerable diligence" and that its inspection and follow up need
not be 100% effective. i 6°
Not all acts of non-compliance by a licensee put the licensor at
risk of losing its marks. In fact, if the licensor seeks to terminate its
license without sufficient justification, the agreement can be specifically enforced against the licensor. i6i In Ron Matusalem & Matusa,
Inc. v. Ron Matusalem,Inc.,' 62 plaintiff appealed the district court's
holding that defendant had not breached its sub-franchise contract,
and that plaintiff's termination of the sub-franchise was invalid. In
affirming, the court held that plaintiff's evidence as to the extent
and duration of the sub-franchisee's alleged deviation from the required secret formula for RON MATUSALEM rum was inconclusive.i '3 The record also showed that both parties at times had
ignored the letter of agreement.l 64 Nor had defendant repudiated
the sub-franchise agreement by applying to register RON
MATUSALEM for rum, and refusing to assign the application to
plaintiff, because by seeking a registration, the defendant was acting for plaintiff's benefit.'i The court did affirm the order that the
166
registrations and applications be assigned to plaintiff.
156. Id. at 292, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.
157. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Autoteller Sys. Serv. Corp., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1740 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (registration cancelled where agreement with alleged licensee provided no mechanism for control).
158. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267 (T.T.A.B. 1989), aff'd., 906 F.2d 1568, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
159. Id. at 1268-69.
160. Id. at 1275.
161. See B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 4.05 for a discussion of licensing in gross.
162. 872 F.2d 1547, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2014 (11th Cir. 1989).
163. Id. at 1552, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2018-19,
164. Id., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2019.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1554, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2020-21.
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A potentially far-reaching decision on the tort liability of a
trademark licensor was rendered in Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 16 7 In that case a federal district court had granted summary
judgment that defendant, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Goodyear
USA) was not subject to strict liability for an allegedly accidentcausing defective tire manufactured by Goodyear Tyre & Rubber
Great Britain, Ltd. and designed by a Luxembourg Goodyear licensee. 168 The appellate court took two cracks at the matter and in its
second opinion certified the question of licensor liability to Arizona's highest state court.1 69 The Arizona Supreme court held that
a trademark licensor is strictly liable: (1) where a licensee marketed
the defective unreasonably dangerous product as if it were the licensor's; (2) where the licensor's relationship with the technical
manufacturer or seller made it a significant participant in the enterprise by which the product is brought to market; and (3) where the
licensor controlled or had the ability to control the design, manufac70
ture or quality of the merchandise.'
The court sidestepped the economic consequences issue which
had concerned the Ninth Circuit majority, opining that denying recovery to those entitled to compensation may be an efficient way to
keep insurance costs lower, but it was not the "optimum"
17
approach. '
IV.

A.

INFRINGEMENT OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS

Likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception

There are several categories of evidence that are usually relevant and material to the question of likelihood of confusion: evidence of source-indicating -significance; evidence of actual
confusion; the conditions of trade; evidence of intent; testimony of
dealers and others experienced in the trade; and reaction tests or
surveys.' 72 These categories apply whether the term is used as a
1 73
trademark or trade name.
167. 163 Ariz. 88, 786 P.2d 939 (Ariz. 1990).
168. Id. at 88, 786 P.2d at 940.

169. Id.
170. Id. at 95, 786 P.2d at 946-47.

171. Id. at 96-97, 786 P.2d at 946.
172. See B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 5.01.
173. See, e.g., Accuride Int'l, Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 10

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1589 (9th Cir. 1989) (no likelihood of confusion between
trade name ACCURIDE INTERNATIONAL INC. for the maker of truck
wheels and trade name ACCURIDE CORP. for the maker of drawer slides).

In the following cases, the marks at issue were found to be confusingly similar. Miss Universe, Inc. v. Pitts, 714 F. Supp. 209, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2004
(W.D. La. 1989) (MRS. USA, MRS. UNIVERSE and MRS. [State or locality]

USA and MISS USA, MISS UNIVERSE and MISS [State or locality] USA for
beauty contests); HRL Assoc., Inc. v. Weiss Assoc., Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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B. Similarity of appearance,sound or connotation
The similarity of appearance, sound, or connotation may lead to
confusion. 174 A mark that has a different connotation may dispel

confusion between it and an otherwise similar mark.

75

similarity in sound may create a likelihood of confusion.
C.

However,

176

Marketing environment

In Dieter v. B & H Industries, Inc.,17' both parties used the

mark SHUTTERWORLD for window shutters, but the district
court found confusion unlikely based upon dissimilarity of the parties' customers and methods of sale. The appellate court reversed,
1819 (T.T.A.B. 1989), cff'd., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1840 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (TMM and TMS for computer software); Temple Univ. v. Tsokas, No. 881106 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 11, 1989) (LEXIS, Patcop library, T.T.A.B. file) (TEMPLE
in connection with dental services and TEMPLE UNIVERSITY and TEMPLE
School of Dentistry); Crain Communications, Inc. v. Fairchild Publications, Inc.,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1214 (E.D. Mich 1989) (AUTOMOTIVE ELECTRONIC
NEWS for auto industry magazine and AUTOMOTIVE NEWS for similar publication); RPF Holding Corp. v. Bedrooms Plus, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291
(D.N.J. 1988) (BEDROOMS PLUS and ROOM PLUS and ROOM PLUS FURNITURE, INC. for furniture) In re Decombe, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812
(T.T.A.B. 1988) (CAPRICE for fresh fruit and CAPRICE for biscuits, cookies,
wafers and candies); Polymer Dynamics, Inc. v. Cabot Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1220 (D.C. Del. 1989) (VISCOLITE and VISCOLAS on body protection
appliances and shock attenuating material, respectively); Surf Line Hawaii,
Ltd. v. Ahakuelo, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1975 (D. Haw. 1989) (HAWAIIAN JAM
for T-shirts and JAMS for shorts, swim trunks, and clothing).
In the following cases, no likelihood of confusion was found. TNT Ltd. v.
TNT Messenger Serv., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 201, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1649
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (TNT Skypack for international courier service and TNT Messenger for intracity messenger service); NEC Electronics, Inc. v. New England
Circuit Sales, Inc., 722 F. Supp 861, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1058 (D. Mass 1989)
(NEC for integrated circuits and computer chips and NECS for computer chip
brokerage business); National Yellow Pages Serv. Assoc. v. O'Connor Agency,
Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (NATIONAL YELLOW PAGES
SERVICE ASSOCIATION for a trade organization promoting national yellow
pages advertising and NATIONAL YELLOW PAGES ASSISTANCE DEPARTMENT for selling national yellow pages advertising, based upon the differences in the marks and the services).
174. See B. PAVTISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 5.02 for a discussion of similiarity of appearance, sound or connotation.
175. Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (E.D. Pa.
1989), summary judgment granted, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1941 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(COUNTRY FLOORS for ceramic tiles and related goods insufficiently likely
to be confused with COUNTRY TILES for tiles to warrant preliminary relief,
the court noting that the use of COUNTRY in plaintiff's mark connoted rural
or rustic origins, while in defendant's it described tiles originating from various
countries).
176. Mister Twister Inc. v. Jenem Corp., 710 F. Supp. 202, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1310 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (WEST SISTER TWISTER for fishing lures likely
to be confused with MISTER TWISTER mark for fishing lures, finding the
marks similar because they have the same rhyming scheme).
177. 880 F.2d 322, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 369 (1990).
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finding that becasue the people who bought the shutters of both
parties were home owners in a relatively small geographic area, the
fact that Dieter made most of its sales from retail outlets and
through dealers, and B&H through home solicitation, did not distinguish their retail strategies enough.1 78 The court also reversed the
finding that the geographic distance between the parties decreased
the likelihood of confusion, stating that their geographic areas, located in Southwest Florida, were close enough for there to be significant advertising overlap.' 7 9
D.

Similarity of goods and services

In Tiffany & Co. v. Classic Motor Carriages,Inc.,8 0° the Board
sustained Tiffany & Co.'s opposition to Classic Motor Carriages' application to register the mark CLASSIC TIFFANY for automobiles.
Due to the fame of opposer's TIFFANY mark for jewelry and its
reputation for luxury goods, consumers were likely to be confused
into believing that applicant's luxury automobiles were sponsored
by or associated with the opposer.' 8 '
E.

Actual Confusion

It is a black letter law that evidence of actual consumer confusion is not a prerequisite to prevailing in a trademark infringement
suit. 8 2 Similarly, it has often been said that the absence of actual
confusion is not dispositive because such evidence is difficult to ob178. Id. at 326-27, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724.
179. Id. In American Int'l Group, Inc. v. American Int'l Airways, Inc., 726 F.
Supp. 1470, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933 (E.D. Pa. 1989), later proceedings, Nos.
88-8242, 89-7610 (E.D. Penn. Feb 8, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. File),
American International Group, ("AIG") sought to preliminary enjoin American
International Airways from using the mark AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
for airline transportation services. AIG owned a registration of the mark for
insurance underwriting, financial services and real estate investment services.
Id. at 1474, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1935. While AIG owned some planes and provided
air transport to its own and other executives, it did not provide air transportation to the public. Id. In denying AIG's motion, the court stated that AIG had
not acquired secondary meaning in defendant's market and that the parties'
services were sufficiently different to preclude likely confusion. Id. at 1478-80,
14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1938-40. As to AIG's market expansion arguments, the court
took note of its officer's comments that it would be "very confusing" for AIG to
be in the aviation insurance business and also a commercial carrier. Id. at 1480,
14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1940.
180. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (T.T.A.B. 1989).
181. Id. at 1841-42. In Saks & Co. v. Snack Food Association, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1833 (T.T.A.B. 1989), the Snack Food Association applied to register
SFA for its association services. Saks opposed based on its registered mark SFA
for retail goods and services, which included various snack foods marketed
through its gourmet shop. Id. The Board held that the parties' goods and services were only remotely connected and dismissed the opposition. Id. at 1836.
182. See B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLiARD, supra note 24, at § 5.01 for a discussion of confusion in terms.
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tain. People who are confused often do not know it, or will not admit it. Nonetheless, some courts have found that lengthy
contemporaneous use without evidence of actual confusion supports
a finding that confusion is unlikely.1 83 There appears to be no clear
guideline, however, as to when this principle will be applied, as was
illustrated by two cases in the past year.
In Greentree Laboratories,Inc. v. G.G. Bean, Inc.,184 the marks
at issue were ODOKLEEN and ODORKLEEN for deodorizing
products. Despite the near-identity of the marks, the court found
that four years of contemporaneous marketing without any evidence of actual confusion "strongly indicate[d]" that no likelihood
of confusion existed.1 8 5 In contrast, in Nina Ricci S.A.R.L. v. ETF
Enterprises Inc., 186 the Federal Circuit held that confusion was
likely between VITTORIO RICCI for handbags, clothing and accessories and NINA RICCI for perfume, clothing and accessories, despite the absence of actual confusion evidence over ten years of
contemporaneous use, since plaintiff's mark was particularly strong
and the difference in first names failed to overcome the strong similarity of the two marks.
One possible explanation for the discrepancies between such
decisions is that with weaker marks a relatively short period of time
without evidence of actual confusion will weigh against the plaintiff, but where strong famous marks are involved relatively long pe87
riods of time without such evidence will be tolerated.
F.

Intent

One of the most interesting decisions of the year was E & J
Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co.,188 a soap opera featuring Ernest
and Julio Gallo and their not so famous brother Joseph. The case
commenced after Joseph decided to market GALLO cheese. In
very detailed findings of fact, the court sets out Ernest and Julio's
rags to riches story which started back in 1933 and evolved until
Gallo became the best-selling brand of wine in the United States,
89
with two billion bottles of Gallo wine sold in the last 15 years.'
Ernest and Julio also license Sara Lee to use the mark GALLO
183. Id.
184. 718 F. Supp. 998 (D. Me. 1989).
185. Id. at 1002.
186. 889 F.2d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
187. See also Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 725 F. Supp. 790
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990) (actual confusion in the trade is
highly probative of likely confusion, since the trade is more sophisticated than
average consumers).
188. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657 (E.D.Cal. 1989).
189. Id. at 1659-61. The history of E. & J. Gallo Winery is set forth in the
court's findings of fact F8-27.
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SALAME for prepared meats and cheeses. i 9° Although it started
out as a surname and therefore was not immediately distinctive, the
GALLO mark has, as the court states, "become one of a handful of
uniquely well-known consumer trademarks." 191 This is another example of a mark which was weak at its inception but with advertising and promotion became extremely strong and entitled to a broad
scope of protection.
Joseph had been invited to join Ernest and Julio early on in
their business but refused, a decision he undoubtedly came to regret. 192 Joseph essentially had been a rancher and grape farmer
and until 1983, had never used his name on any retail product. At
that time, he decided to sell cheese at retail. His brothers warned
him not to use the GALLO name and he agreed. But apparently
Joseph's marketing advisors convinced him the only way he would
really succeed would be by using his name JOSEPH GALLO to
trade on the famous GALLO trademark. This was all documented
in what became known as the "Cheese Notes," discussed further
below.' 93 For two years, the brothers tried to work out their
problems. Finally, Ernest and Julio sued.
The "Cheese Notes" episode is remarkable. The cheese notes
were the smoking gun, happily discussing the good fortune that
consumers would obviously believe JOSEPH GALLO cheese comes
from the folks who sell the wine. The "Cheese Notes" were located
in the files of the defendant's advertising agency. When those files
were subpoenaed, however, the cheese notes were not in them.
They apparently were taken out and put in an income tax file
marked "Joseph E. Gallo Tax File-Old." The court commenting on
this clever bit of self destruction stated:
The inference is unavoidable that Defendants removed the Cheese
Notes from [the ad agency file] and hoped to prevent plaintiffs discovery of the Cheese Notes by burying the documents in an irrelevant tax
file. The cheese notes are cogent, independent evidence of likelihood
of confusion. Defendants' obvious attempt to forestall Plaintiff's disevidence is indicative of a conscious purpose to conceal
covery of such
i 94
the truth.
The defendant was enjoined from all trademark use of JOSEPH
GALLO. 195 However, the court did allow the defendant some minimal and secondary trade name use of Joseph Gallo, which under
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1661-62.
1661.
1662-64.
1666-67.

194. Id. at 1666.
195. Id. at 1677.
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the circumstances appears generous. 1 9
G.

Counterfeiting

Counterfeiting cases under the Lanham Act typically demonstrate the most blatant examples of bad intent. In order to be a
counterfeit a mark need not be exactly like the true mark, but must
1 97
only be substantially indistinguishable from it.
Trademark owners may obtain an ex parte seizure of the counterfeit goods upon court order pursuant to section 34(d) of the Lan-

ham Act. 198 The seizures, however, must be carried out properly.
An applicant must show that he has not publicized the seizure, 1 9
and after the seizure, the court is bound to protect the party from

publicity. 2° ° Similarly, the court is explicitly bound to protect the
accused party from disclosure of confidential information. 201 If a
seizure order is exceeded, the defendant may counterclaim for damages due to wrongful seizure, including damages for loss of materi20 2
als, loss of goodwill, lost profits and punitive damages.
In General Electric Co. v. Speicher,20 3 the district court had
found plaintiff liable for wrongful seizure because it took unauthor-

ized photographs of defendant's place of business, seized goods
which were not counterfeits, and kept the seized goods rather than
placing them in the court's custody. For those wrongful acts, plain2 °4
tiff was held liable for $1,100.00 in lost profits and attorney's fees.
196. Id. at 1678. Another noteworthy intent case is United States Hosiery
Corp. v. Gap, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 800, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1721 (W.D.N.C. 1989), where

defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that its use of WORK
FORCE for denim products was not likely to cause confusion with plaintiff's

use of WORKFORCE for socks, relying on its alleged good faith use. The court
stated that lack of intent to profit by another's mark is not a defense to infringement when confusion is likely; evidence that such intent exists, on the other
hand, is highly probative on the confusion issue. Id. at 814, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1731. In this case, defendant had anticipated plaintiff's objection to its use of
WORK FORCE. While this did not necessarily evidence a guilty heart, it created a genuine issue of material fact regarding defendant's intent. Id.
197. ASICS Corp. v. Antillas Shoe Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783 (D. P.R.
1989) (defendant counterfeited plaintiff's ASICS TIGER, Cross Line Design
and TIGER Cross Line Design marks for shoes; design mark "nearly
identical").
198. See National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Jamal, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1772 (11th Cir. 1989) (NFL, Cincinnati Bengals, and the San Francisco
Forty Niners obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order and order of
seizure against various defendants selling alleged counterfeits of licensed merchandise in connection with Super Bowl XXIII in 1989).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(ii) (1988).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(6) (1988).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(7) (1988).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) (1988).
203. 676 F. Supp. 1421, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1258 (N.D. Ind. 1988), rev'd, 877
F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1988).
204. Id. at 1436, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
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The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding no wrongful seizure.20 5
It held the plaintiff had not exceeded the broad seizure order entered by the district court, which encompassed non-counterfeit
2°6
items and authorized General Electric to retain the seized items.
As to the unauthorized photographs, the court found no violation of
the Order as everything that was photographed could have been
seized. 20 7 The case was remanded for a new trial on plaintiff's dam20 8
age entitlement.
Absent extenuating circumstances, a party found to have intentionally trafficked in counterfeit goods is liable for treble damages,
attorneys' fees and investigatory fees.209 In Louis Vuitton S.A. v.
Lee,210 Vuitton sued two immigrant retailers. The uncontested pretrial order included the parties' written stipulation that defendants
2 11
"knowingly and willfully" sold counterfeit Vuitton merchandise.
The district court interpreted the stipulation to mean only that defendants had knowingly sold the merchandise, as opposed to knowing the merchandise was counterfeit. 212 The court granted a
permanent injunction, but denied all monetary relief on "equitable"
205. General Electric Co. v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531 (7th 1989).
206. Id. at 537-38.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 539. In Skierkewiecz v. Gonzalez, 711 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ill. 1989),
later proceeding, Slaengers Ltd. v. Stoller, No. 88c3722 (M.D. Ill. July 24, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) on a motion to dismiss plaintiff's wrongful
seizure action, the defendant's attorneys contended that their alleged misrepresentations were made in the course of representing their client's "legitimate
trademark interest" and could not be attacked absent a showing of malice. In
holding plaintiff's allegations of misleading statements and bad faith sufficient
to state a claim, the court stated that the statute "does not explicitly or implicitly require the plaintiff to show the applicant [for the seizure order] acted with
malice in obtaining the order, even where the applicant was an attorney allegedly acting on his client's behalf." Id. at 934. Count II, in which plaintiffs alleged that the defendants used the seizure order to obtain jurisdiction and
possession over plaintiff's property, was dismissed, however, "because plaintiffs
have failed to allege that the defendants used the Order of Seizure to accomplish a purpose beyond the intended scope of the Order." Id. at 935.
Although denying summary judgment for plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim for wrongful seizure, the Court in Slazengers Ltd. v. Stoller, No. 88 C 3722
(N.D. Ill. May 31, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file), strongly suggested
that plaintiff had not acted improperly in seeking an ex parte temporary restraining order and seizure order based upon defendant's sale of allegedly counterfeit PANTHER tennis racquets. The court distanced itself from earlier
intimations that plaintiffs may have acted excessively, stating that the court's
statements themselves may have been "excessive." Id. The court also ruled
that its failure to technically comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 in framing its preliminary injunction order did not invalidate the order, since 15 U.S.C. 1116 provided a separate basis for the injunction, and held defendants in contempt. Id.
209. § 15 U.S.C. 1117(b) (1988). See, e.g., Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Downtown
Luggage Center, 706 F. Supp. 839, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
210. 875 F.2d 584, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1935 (7th Cir. 1989).
211. Id. at 587, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937-38.
212. Id.
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grounds, and stated "[t]he trademark laws entitled plaintiffs to protect their merchandise, as they did and should, but this court need
not, and will not, allow plaintiffs to use the laws as a sword, and
their millions as a mace, to crush two small unsophisticated and un' ' 213
wary immigrant merchants.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court improperly interpreted the stipulation, as it could only mean that the
defendants knew they were selling counterfeits. 2 14 Observing that
"willful blindness" is sufficient to satisfy the knowledge requirement of section 1117(b), the court also found that defendants, at the
very least, had an obligation to ask their suppliers whether the
Vuitton items were genuine or counterfeit. 215 Criticizing the denial
of monetary relief, the court further stated, "'Equity' is not a roving commission to redistribute wealth from large companies to
216
small ones. The Lanham Act was not written by Robin Hood."
In ordering that a new judge be assigned to the case, the appellate
court further observed that the lower court "forgot that while the
Lee's are human, so are the customers, employees, suppliers and
owners of Louis Vuitton. A corporation is not a thing; it's a network of relations among human beings. '2 1 7 It accordingly reversed
218
and remanded for a new trial on damages.
213. Id. (quoting Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. Lee, 692 F. Supp. 906, 911-12 (N.D. Ill.

1988).
214. Id. at 587, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937.
215. Id. at 590, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
216. Id. at 589, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
217. Id. at 590, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
218. Id. at 591, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. Counterfeiting also is a crime
punishable by up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine for first time offenders. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1988). In United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1871 (11th Cir. 1989), a criminal counterfeiting case, defendant's explanation that he had purchased counterfeit watches for $20 to $25 a
piece, and sold them for between $30 and $35 was not excluded from defendant's criminal trial for trademark counterfeiting even though he had not been
read his Miranda rights, because a reasonable person in his position would not
have considered himself under arrest or subject to governmental restraint at
the time the statements were made. Id. at 1445.
In United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3258 (1989), Yamin was a joint owner of a corporation that sold thousands of counterfeit watches. Witnesses testified that
watches were also purchased at Yamin's apartment, and that he was present
during many sales and sold watches himself. Id. at 134, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1302. The appellate court upheld defendant's criminal counterfeiting conviction
and held that the district court did not commit error when his jury instruction
referred to likelihood of confusion in the post-sale context. Id. at 132-33, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. The court also found ample evidence of Yamin's
"knowing participation in a conspiracy to make the sales." Id. at 134, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. While finding plausible the defendant's "novel argument" that the government had violated the best evidence rule by failing to
introduce into evidence any watches showing the "written" counterfeit mark,
the court nonetheless found that the "object bearing a mark is both a chattel
and a writing, and the trial judge has discretion to treat it as a chattel, to which
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PROOF OF INFRINGEMENT

Surveys and reaction tests

Survey evidence has been employed increasingly in trademark
litigation to help prove issues such as secondary meaning or likelihood of confusion.
In Girls Clubs of America, Inc. v. Boys Clubs of America,
Inc.,219 defendant organization had been preliminarily enjoined
from changing its name from BOYS CLUBS OF AMERICA to
BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS OF AMERICA. The court found that
defendant's annual meeting notice proposing a vote to change the
name to BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS USA, did not constitute contempt. 220 An injunction against such a vote pending completion of
trial, however, was granted. 221
Defendants offered a survey to support its contention that the
proposed name was not likely to cause confusion, but the court
found it seriously flawed:
[B]y focusing on the organizations' logos, rather than their names, defendant focused the attention of the respondents, the interviewers, and
the supervisors on the most distinctive feature of the images of the
cards. Defendant thus introduced an element of distinctiveness which
does not exist when the organizations' names appear with their logos
less prominently displayed or without their logos altogether, e.g., in the
media, or when they are heard rather than seen ....The distinctiveness of the logos, and the prominence with which they were featured
in the presentation made to the respondents, improperly skewed the
results toward'
a showing of distinctiveness, and away from
222
similarity.
A second serious flaw was the failure to control or record in
what order the logo cards were presented to respondents. 223 In addition, the test field was crowded with nine different logos for no
224
justifiable reason.
In Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 225 plaintiff's survey
helped convince the court that the color scheme and graphic display
of its VSW logo was distinctive. Over 80% of the survey's respondents identified the logo with plaintiff's clothing, designed for
the best evidence rule does not apply." Id., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. The
inaccuracy or fraud concerns embodied in the best evidence rule also were not
present, since "[t]he viewing of a simple and recognized trademark is not likely
to be inaccurately remembered." Id.
219. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
220. Id. at 1529.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1526-27 (quoting plaintiff's post-hearing memorandum at 16).
223. Id. at 1527.

224. Id.
225. 888 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1989).
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skateboard enthusiasts. 226 Limiting the universe to 10 to 18 year
olds who were in attendance at skateboarding events or read

skateboarding magazines, rather than 15 to 25 year olds who
purchase active wear, did decrease the probative value of the survey.2 27 Nonetheless, in conjunction with plaintiff's sales and advertising, and evidence of direct copying, the survey was found
2
persuasive. 2VI.

SPECIAL DEFENSES AND LIMITATIONS

A.

Laches and acquiescence

The basic elements of laches are that (a)plaintiff had knowledge of defendant's use of its marks; (b)plaintiff inexcusably
delayed in taking action with respect thereto; and (c)defendant detrimentally relied upon plaintiff's inaction or otherwise would be inequitably prejudiced were plaintiff permitted to assert its rights at
the time of filing. 2 2 9 As noted above, the Revision Act establishes
that equitable defenses such as laches and acquiescence are avail226. Id. at 615.
227. Id.
228. Id. Other survey cases of interest are Kingsford Products Co. v. Kingsfords, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1013, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350 (D. Kan. 1989), where
the court (1) denied plaintiff's motion to preliminarily enjoin defendant's use of
the trade name KINGSFORD on barbecue sauce based on plaintiff's back label
use of KINGSFORD on its K.C. MASTERPIECE barbecue sauce, and (2) criticized plaintiff's confusion survey because it was conducted in a limited geographical area where defendant's product was not sold; and Prince Mfg., Inc. v.
Bard Int'l Assoc., Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1419 (D.N.J. 1988) (not for publication), where the court (1) denied plaintiff's motion to preliminarily enjoin defendant's use of BARD PRINCESS for tennis rackets based on plaintiff's mark
PRINCE for tennis rackets, and (2) gave plaintiff's statistical "non-probability"
survey scant weight, first, because it focused on the marks PRINCE and PRINCESS rather than BARD PRINCESS, second, because it did not canvass BARD
PRINCESS'S "niche market," namely, girls or small women who buy a $130
racquet, and third, because the questions were leading and directed primarily to
trade dress; see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1657 (E.D. Cal. 1989) (survey in which half of respondents were shown
defendant's label and half shown a hypothetical defendant label bearing a disclaimer showed both a high level of confusion and that disclaimer did not significantly reduce source confusion); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989) (discounting survey of "thoroughly uninformed
consumers" regarding perception of initials LA on beer); Berkshire Fashions,
Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 725 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), off'd, 904 F.2d 33 (2d
Cir. 1990) (defendant's survey rejected where side-by-side comparison was utilized and underlying data was not made available to the Court or other party);
Transfer Print Foils, Inc. v. Transfer Print America, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 425
(D.N.J. 1989) (survey showing 48% of respondents believed TRANSFER
PRINT was generic for surface printing equipment rejected where respondents
were selected from defendant's customer list).
229. See B. PArrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 7.02 for discussion of laches and acquiesence.
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able in actions involving incontestable registrations. 230
In Nabisco Brands Inc. v. Conusa Corp.,231 the court preliminarily enjoined defendant from selling its hard roll candy which was
virtually identical in color, size, and configuration to plaintiff's
LIFESAVERS candies. The court held that plaintiff's configuration was non-functional and had acquired secondary meaning, and
that plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits.2 32 In rejecting
defendant's contention that plaintiff's delay in bringing suit precluded a finding of irreparable harm, the court stated that "laches
should not necessarily always be measured from defendant's very
first use of the contested mark, but from the date that defendant's
acts first significantly impacted on plaintiff's goodwill and business
reputation." 2 33 Given defendant's history of sporadic sales, the
court held that plaintiff's delay was not so unreasonable as to give
234
rise to laches.
A delay of several months can undercut a plaintiff's ability to
show irreparable harm and lead to the denial of a motion for preliminary injunction. In Comic Strip, Inc. v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc. ,235 plaintiff operated comedy clubs under the name THE
COMIC STRIP and sought a preliminary injunction against Fox's
use of COMIC STRIP in connection with its TV broadcasts. The
court found plaintiff was likely to succeed in proving that its mark
236
had acquired secondary meaning, and that confusion was likely.
However, the court denied preliminary relief on the ground that
230. See Emilio Pucci Societa a Responsibilita Limitata v. Pucci Corp., 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1541 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (pre-Revision Act case addressing the
applicability issue).

231. 722 F. Supp. 1287 (M.D.N.C. 1989), qff'd, 892 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1989).
232. Id. at 1291-92.
233. Id. at 1292.
234. Id. Despite waiting over eight years to sue, the former manager of the
singing group "The Three Degrees" was awarded an injunction against former
group members who resumed use of the name following a dispute. Three Degrees Enterprise, Inc. v. Three Degrees Worldwide, Inc., No. 89-5131 (E.D.Pa.
Oct. 11, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). The court found the manager
owned the right to use the name, but that his undue delay constituted laches
warranting denial of an accounting of profits. Id.
In Construction Technology, Inc. v. Lockformer Co., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1212,
10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the court determined, with reference to New York civil procedure rules, that the applicable statute of limitations for a Lanham Act misrepresentation claim was the three year injury to
property period rather than the six year or two year periods for causes of action
involving fraud. In so doing, the court deviated from a prior application of the
six year rule in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 578 F. Supp 196,
223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), because, as it noted, a Lanham Act
claim does not require elements of bad faith or scienter, and "intent is largely
irrelevant in determining if consumers likely will be confused." Construction
Technology, 704 F. Supp. at 1219-20, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1406.
235. 710 F. Supp. 976, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608, (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
236. Id. at 980, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
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plaintiff's seven month delay in bringing suit (including three
months after settlement negotiations concluded) militated against a
23 7
finding of irreparable harm.
B.

Unclean hands

In Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Testini,238 plaintiff alleged that defendant sold counterfeits of its BAMBU cigarette papers. While essentially conceding infringement, the defendants nonetheless argued
that plaintiff had unclean hands since its product bearing the mark
was used in connection with illicit drugs, namely marijuana. 239 The
court ruled that unclean hands was not a defense to liability but was
240
only relevant to the issue of damages.
C. Concurrentrights
Although federal registration normally gives the mark owner
national rights to use the mark, a good faith pre-registration user is
entitled to use the mark in the areas in which he has acquired rights
24 1
by his continuous use.
In Uno's Pizza, Inc. v. Pizzeria Uno Corp.,242 both parties
claimed superior rights in the mark UNO'S for restaurant services
in the small town of Cheektowaga, N.Y. Defendant used the mark
in connection with a Chicago based pizzeria chain. Plaintiff and defendant had previously agreed that plaintiff would restrict its use to
an ill-defined trading area in Western New York. 243 In 1989 plaintiff sued defendant over defendant's plans to open a restaurant in a
mall near one of plaintiff's restaurants. 244 The court found that
plaintiff failed to establish a violation of the agreed trading boundaries, or that attracting occasional customers from Cheektowaga established that the mall fell within those boundaries. 245 Conversely,
the defendant failed to establish that the mall did not. Accordingly,
237. Id. at 980-81, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613-14; see also Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. v. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1391
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (E.D.
Pa. 1989), summary judgment granted, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1941 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (delay of 3.5 months in filing and moving for a preliminary injunction
belied plaintiff's assertion of irreparable harm and led the Court to deny the
motion).
238. No. 87 CV 3190 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist

file).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 7.05 for discusion

of concurrent rights.
242. 722 F. Supp. 971 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
243. Id. at 973-74.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 976.
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the court denied both parties' preliminary injunction motions. 246
In Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College District,247 TallyHo had obtained a Florida state registration for YOU AND THE
LAW for a cable television show shown in Dade County. Coast,
however, had previously used the same mark for educational videotapes shown on college campuses in parts of Florida other than
Dade County. 248 In denying Tally-Ho's motion for preliminary injunction, the district court found that Coast's rights in the mark
extended to television broadcasts and expanded Coast's presumptive priority to all of Florida. 249 It apparently confused the "related
goods" doctrine, which extends a trademark owner's right to related goods or services, with the "zone of natural expansion" doctrine which extends a trademark owner's rights to geographic areas
which are considered natural areas of business expansion. 25° The
appellate court reversed, finding that Tally-Ho's rights were prior
in Dade County. 251 Coast had not sufficiently demonstrated its tendency for geographic expansion by the date of Tally-Ho's use to establish rights in Dade County.252
When two or more individuals work together to develop a product, disputes can arise as to ownership rights. In Hoyle Knitting
246. Id. at 977.
247. 889 F.2d 1018 (11th Cir. 1989).
248. Id. at 1021.
249. Id. at 1021-22.
250. Id. at 1073.
251. Id. at 1027.
252. Id. at 1028. Other concurrent use cases of interest include the following:
Mid-States Dist. Co. v. Morrison Oil Co., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860 (T.T.A.B.
1989), a concurrent use proceeding, involved a modification of the parties' earlier concurrent use agreement. Having let prior registrations lapse, both MidStates and Morrison applied again for a registration of DUREX for anti-freeze
with Mid-States now seeking more territory. The court held that in the absence
of any clear evidence of overlapping use, there was no justification for refusing
a concurrent registration to Mid-States for the states requested (with the exception of Pennsylvania and North Carolina); it also restricted the scope of Morrison's registration. Id
In Action Temporary Serv., Inc. v. Labor Force, Inc., 870 F.2d 1563, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307 (Fed. Cir., 1989), a concurrent use proceeding involving
the mark LABOR FORCE, the court reversed the Board's grant of summary
judgment to Labor Force, Inc., holding that although a registration provides
constructive notice during its existence, a cancelled registration does not provide such constructive notice, and cannot prevent a party from being a "lawful
user" of mark if that party's use is subsequent to cancellation.
In Shell Stores Corp. v. Joy Optics, NO. 87-4184 (D.N.J. May 24, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (not for publication), plaintiff and its predecessors sold ready-made glasses and sunglasses under the marks JOY and JOY
OPTICAL. To dispose of an opposition filed by defendant, plaintiff consented
to use by defendants of the marks JOY and JOY OPTICS on eyeglass frames,
sunglass frames, eyeglasses and other related items. Id. The agreement basically divided the market between the ophthalmic and non-ophthalmic trade.
Id. Plaintiff brought suit alleging that defendant had breached the agreement
and infringed its mark by selling to non-professionals. Id. The court refused to
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Mills, Inc. v. T.J. Manalo, Inc.,253 applicant sought to register the
mark MIX CONCRETE for young men's sweaters. Opposer, a former business partner, claimed that it had participated in the development of that particular line of sweaters and was therefore a joint

owner of the mark. 2M The Board dismissed the opposition, concluding that the MIX CONCRETE line was essentially applicant's
255
creation, with no substantial contribution from opposer.

D.

Gray market goods

A gray market good is a foreign-manufactured good that bears
a valid domestic (U.S.) trademark but is imported without the con-

sent of the domestic (U.S.) trademark owner. 256 Customs' Regulation interpreting section 526 of the Tariff Act 257 previously
permitted the entry of goods manufactured abroad without the domestic trademark owner's written consent where both the foreign
and the U.S. trademark were owned by "the same person" (c(1)), or
where the foreign and domestic trademark owners were parent and

subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to common ownership or
control (c(2)), or where use of the trademark by a foreign manufacturer was authorized by the U.S. trademark owner (c(3)). 25 8 In K
Mart Corp. v. CartierInc.,259 a majority held that given the ambiguities in the statutory terms "foreign manufacture" and "owned by",
c(1) and c(2) were valid regulatory interpretations of section 526.
However, a different majority struck down c(3) which permitted
importation where an independent foreign manufacturer was authorized (i.e. licensed) to use the trademark by the domestic trademark owner. 2 6° Customs has now deleted the c(3) portion of the
rescind the prior agreement for breach, but based upon plaintiff's confusion
evidence, defendant's sales were restricted to the pure ophthalmic market. Id.
In Architemps, Inc. v. Architemps, Ltd., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), plaintiff, the junior user, obtained a federal registration of
ARCHITEMPS for an architectural placement firm. Defendant was the senior
user, but the Court found that "defendant's having placed two individuals in
Washington-area architecture and design firms, when combined with its minimal presence in other respects, does not amount to use of its mark in that area."
Id. at 1887. It therefore held that defendant had no priority or right to expand
into that area. Id.
253. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1720 (T.T.A.B. 1989).
254. Id. at 1724.
255. Id. at 1725-26; see also Durango Herald, Inc. v. Riddle, 719 F. Supp. 941,
11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1052 (D. Colo. 1988) (Dissolution of joint venture did not
extinguish parties' joint rights in DIRECTORY PLUS mark).
256. See B. PATriSHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 7.06 for discussion
of grey market goods.
257. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1987).
258. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
259. 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
260. Id. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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261

In Yamaha Corp. of America v. ABC International Traders
Corp.,262 plaintiff, owner of U.S. registrations for YAMAHA, alleged violations of section 526 of the Tariff Act, section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, and California law based upon defendant's unauthorized importation of goods bearing the YAMAHA trademarks. The
goods at issue were manufactured by Yamaha-Japan, plaintiff's
Japanese parent.263 The defendant had disclaimed that it was officially sponsored or approved by Yamaha-Japan or YamahaAmerica or that it could supply the purchaser with a YAMAHA
warranty or authorized service or training.264 The court held that
there was no triable issue of fact as to the genuineness of the goods
or the possibility of customer confusion. 265 Relying on K Mart, the
court held that plaintiff, as a wholly owned subsidiary of YamahaJapan, was not entitled to claim protection under section 526 of the
Tariff Act. 2 6 6 Further, the court held that the importation of genuine goods was not actionable under the Lanham Act, and granted
267
defendant's motion for summary judgment.
In Weil Ceramics & Glass Inc. v. Dash,268 plaintiff, the whollyowned subsidiary of a foreign manufacturer and owner of U.S.
rights in the LLADRO trademark, sought to prevent defendant's
importation of LLADRO porcelain under both the Tariff Act and
the Lanham Act. On appeal, Weil argued that since it was not a
sham corporation and independently owned the United States
LLADRO trademark, the K Mart decision did not preclude section
526 protection. 269 The Third Circuit, however, found that Weil's relationship with its foreign parent presented the potential for an undesired monopoly of the domestic market and warranted
27 0
application of the section 133.21 common control exception.
The court also held that Weil was not entitled to protection
under either section 42 or section 32 of the Lanham Act because
Weil was not independent of the foreign manufacturer, but instead
27
received profits from the foreign parent's sales to defendant. '
Furthermore, the foreign parent had the power to cease the sales to
261. 55 Fed. Reg. 52040 (1990) (amending 19 C.F.R. § 133.21).
262. 703 F. Supp. 1398, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1134 (C.D. Cal. 1988), laterproceeding, 745 F. Supp. 734 (D. Dist. Col. 1990).
263. Id. at 1400, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
264. Id. at 1402, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1403, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137-38.
267. Id. at 1404, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
268. 878 F.2d 659, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
156 (1989).
269. Id. at 666, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 668, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
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defendant and prevent the objectionable importation. 272 Since the
goods were identical, the court found that consumers got precisely
what they believed they were purchasing, and that Weil's goodwill
was not diminished by an association with goods of a lesser
27 3
quality.
In Lever Brothers Co. v. United States,2 74 plaintiff, Lever
Brothers (Lever U.S.), a domestic corporation affiliated with a British corporation, Lever U.K., unsuccessfully sought to preliminarily
enjoin Customs' application of section 133.21 to third party parallel
imports of British SHIELD deodorant soap and SUNLIGHT
dishwashing detergent. On appeal, Lever U.S. argued that where
foreign-manufactured genuine goods are materially different from
the domestic, the foreign products "copy or simulate" the domestic
trademark in violation of section 42 of the Lanham Act. 275 Consumer letters expressing rage or disappointment at what they had
believed to be a discounted version of the familiar U.S. product sup27 6
ported Lever's position.
The appellate court found that the SUNLIGHT and SHIELD
trademarks had different meanings in the two countries, and that
27 7
It
their use in the U.S. for the U.K. products was not truthful.
also found that section 42 bars foreign goods bearing a trademark
identical to a valid U.S. trademark, but different in physical content, regardless of the trademark's genuine character abroad or the
affiliation between the producing firms.278 The court adopted its
findings tentatively, however, and remanded, stating, "subject to
some persuasive evidence running against our tentative conclusion,
'279
we must say that Lever's probability of success is quite high.
In a 1983 consent judgment, Global Imports, Inc. was enjoined
from importing and selling in the U.S. DURACELL batteries manufactured abroad by Duracell, Inc. In Duracell, Inc. v. Global Imports, Inc.,280 Global sought to have the judgment vacated on the
ground that K Mart constituted a change in the law making continued enforcement inequitable. The court first observed that K-Mart
held that the "common control exception" regulations were valid
but left open the Lanham Act issues. 28 ' In refusing to vacate the
injunction, the court held that in the Second Circuit, the U.S. trade272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Id. at 672, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
877 F.2d 101, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 103-04, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
Id. at 103, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
Id. at 108, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
Id. at 111, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id.
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1651 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 1653 n.1.
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mark owner's right to a private remedy remained unchanged, since
gray market goods covered by the "common control exception" may
282
still cause consumer confusion in violation of the Lanham Act.
E. Permitted use
Parodies or other uses of another's trademark normally are
permitted where no likelihood of confusion is created, although a
283
particular use may be enjoined if dilution occurs.
In C7iffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing
Group Inc.,284 the district court preliminarily enjoined distribution
of SPY NOTES, a parody which mimicked the distinctive cover design of CLIFFS NOTES study guides. Doubleday argued that parody is a form of artistic expression protected by the first
amendment, while Cliffs Notes argued that the court should apply
the traditional likelihood of confusion test. 28 5 The Second Circuit
followed Rogers v. Grimaldi28 6 and held that the Lanham Act was
generally applicable to artistic works, including parody, where the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighed the public interest in free expression. 28 7 The court further stated that "the
expressive elements of parodies require more protection than the
labeling of ordinary commercial products" and that a higher risk of
confusion accordingly should be tolerated when a trademark holder
seeks to enjoin a parody. 288 Applying the Rogers balancing test, the
court found that the public interest in parody outweighed the risk
of confusion between SPY NOTES and CLIFFS NOTES, and va28 9
cated the injunction.
In Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc.,2 9 ° the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's trademark infringement action. Plaintiff, owner of the registered trademarks DOM
PERIGNON and a Shield Design sued defendant over the use of
plaintiff's label on its popcorn bottle and the mark DOM
POPIGNON. 2 91 Rejecting defendant's parody defense, the court
found that defendant's use was not a sufficiently strong parody to
282. Id. at 1653.
283. For a discussion of trademark parody and the dilution theory, see Note,
TrademarkParody: A Fair Use and FirstAmendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV.
1079, 1092-99 (1986).
284. 886 F.2d 490, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (2d Cir. 1989).
285. Id. at 493, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
286. 695 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); see
Section VII(B) of this article for a discussion of Rogers.
287. 886 F.2d at 494-95, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
288. Id. at 495, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
289. Id., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
290. 725 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
291. Id. at 1316.
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dispel confusion, particularly in light of plaintiff's pilot survey dem292
onstrating a high level of consumer confusion.
Another form of permitted use is the fair use of a trademark as
a descriptive term. 293 In Cullmann Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian
Art Works, Inc.,294 plaintiff sued to enjoin defendant from infringing plaintiff's AT-A-GLANCE mark for appointment books and diaries. The court found AT-A-GLANCE mark suggestive and strong
based upon extensive sales. 295 Noting that defendant's marks were
identical to plaintiff's, it concluded that consumer confusion was
inevitable. 296 Defendant's fair use defense also failed because plaintiff's mark was suggestive and defendant's use was neither descriptive nor in good faith, and confusion was likely. 297 The only fair
use, the court opined, would be one "where the words 'At A Glance'
are used, without hyphens, in a sentence in a catalog or
298
advertisement."
F.

Res judicata and collateral estoppel

In enjoining the defendant in Magazine Press, Inc. v.
Doubleday Book & Music aubs, Inc.,299 the court gave preclusive
effect to a Board decision which upheld the plaintiff's predecessor's
priority against defendant's predecessor in the mark CIRCULO DE
LECTORES 'for a Spanish language book club. That previous ac-

292. Id. at 1324.
293. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1988).
294. 717 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), laterproceeding, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1904 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).
295. Id. at 121-22.
296. Id. at 127.
297. Id. at 132-34.
298. Id. at 134. There are two other noteworthy fair use cases. In Dayton
Progress Corp. v. Lane Punch Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1695 (W.D.N.C.
1989), qff'd, 917 F.2d 836, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1700 (4th Cir. 1990), plaintiff, a
manufacturer of precision punches, identified its products with three-letter
product designations (e.g., VJX, VPO, LJX, HJX). Defendant used some of the
same designators to identify its punch products. Id. at 1696-97. Lane unsuccessfully alleged that the designators were descriptive and unprotectable or that it
was making "fair use" of them. The Court found that the designators principally served as trademarks and issued a permanent injunction. Id. at 1697.
In Munters Corp. v. Matsui America, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ill. 1989),
the plaintiff used the incontestably registered mark HONEYCOMBE on its industrial dehumidifiers and also for wheel rotors. Defendant had previously
agreed not to use HONEYCOMB as a trademark on its dehumidifiers, but continued to refer to its wheel rotors as honeycomb-shaped, and to use "honeycomb" as an adjective in its advertising literature. Id. at 793. Despite its
incontestable status, in the strength (and likelihood of confusion) context the
court found plaintiff's HONEYCOMBE mark merely descriptive and lacking
secondary meaning, which weighed against confusion being likely and concluded that injunctive relief was not warranted. Id. at 802. Alternatively, the
court held that defendant's use of HONEYCOMB constituted "fair use" as the
term was used in good faith to describe its product, not as a trademark. Id.
299. No. 89-4116 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
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tion was dismissed with prejudice upon defendant's withdrawal, defendant having had a full opportunity to litigate the priority
issue. 3° A dismissal of a subsequent cancellation proceeding similarly barred defendant from alleging abandonment.3 0 ' In its motion for reconsideration, defendant unsuccessfully sought to
similarly bar plaintiff from alleging likelihood of confusion, because
plaintiff's predecessor in its answer in the previous proceeding had
denied confusion was likely.3 0 2 The court rejected this argument,
3 03
finding the confusion issue had not previously been resolved.
In Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Samsonite Corp.,304 the court held
that an International Trade Commission ruling had res judicata effect in a later civil action. Samsonite had filed a complaint in the
ITC under section 337 of the Tariff Act 3 0 5 alleging that Baltimore's
3 6
importation of its new luggage constituted unfair competition.
The AUI's determination, upheld by the ITC, was that Baltimore's
defenses of unclean hands and anti-trust violations were unsupported by the evidence.30 7 In granting summary judgment to Samsonite on the Baltimore's antitrust and trademark misuse
allegations, the court found that resjudicataapplied to the administrative agency's ruling as the parties had a full and fair opportunity
to adjudicate the issues.3 08 To hold otherwise would allow an unsuccessful ITC litigant to circumvent an appeal to the Federal Circuit by collaterally attacking an ITC determination in district court.
G.

Sovereignty immunity

In United States Gold & Silver Inv., Inc. v. United States,3 0 9
plaintiff sold gold bullion under the mark U.S. GOLD, and sued the
U.S. Mint for marketing gold medallions under the same mark.
The court dismissed the action, holding it barred by sovereign immunity.3 10 The Federal Tort Claims Act did not waive the government's immunity, the court held, because the action was based on
31
Federal Law (the Lanham Act) rather than state law. '
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.

304. 727 F.Supp. 202, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450 (D. Ma. 1989).
305. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988).
306. 727 F.Supp. at 203-04, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
307. Id. at 204, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451-52.
308. Id. at 205, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.

309. 885 F.2d 620, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1237 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S.Ct. 3239 (1990).
310. Id. at 621, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.

311. Id.
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TRADE IDENTITY LAW
A.

Dilution

Dilution does not exist as a cause of action under the Lanham
Act. The inclusion of a dilution provision in the Revision Act was
considered and ultimately rejected. Nonetheless, a statutory cause
of action exists in many states. The essence of dilution is the weakening of the potency of a mark and the gradual debilitation of its
selling power. 312 To obtain relief the mark allegedly being diluted
normally must be distinctive or famous.
In Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.,313 the
plaintiff, Mead Data Central, sought injunctive relief alleging Lanham Act violations and dilution under New York's anti-dilution
statute. The district court held there was no likelihood of confusion
under the Lanham Act between plaintiff's use of LEXIS in connection with computer-assisted legal research services and defendant's
proposed use of LEXUS in connection with a new line of luxury
automobiles. 3 14 However, the court found the LEXUS mark was
likely to dilute Meads' distinctive LEXIS mark, and enjoined
315
Toyota's use.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and
vacated the permanent injunction.3 16 Although the anti-dilution
statute does not require confusion of product or source, the Second
Circuit held that the marks at issue must be "very" or "substantially" similar to state a viable claim of dilution.3 17 The court concluded that the determination of similarity should be based on the
use of the marks in commercial advertising, not "every day spoken
english. 31 8 Noting that commercials generally contain precise diction and a visual reference to the mark and product, the court held
that there was no substantial similarity between Mead's LEXIS
319
mark and Toyota's LEXUS mark.
The court further noted that a mark which circulates only in a
limited market is unlikely to be associated gendrally with the mark
for a dissimilar product circulating elsewhere. 320 Here, the distinctiveness of the LEXIS mark was limited to a narrow market of so312. See B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 8.01 for a discussion of dilution.
313. 702 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
314. Id. at 1040.
315. Id. at 1044.
316. 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
317. Id. at 1029.
318. Id. at 1030.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1031.
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phisticated consumers consisting of attorneys and accountants. 321
Thus, the court held that it was unlikely that there would be any
significant amount of blurring between the LEXIS and LEXUS
322
marks.
In Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc.,323 the district court
enjoined the defendant candy company from marketing and selling
MAD SCIENTIST MAGIC POWDER bubble gum in a plastic
container simulating Coca-Cola's bottle on the ground that such use
diluted the distinctiveness of Coca-Cola's bottle trademark. The
court held that Coca-Cola's bottle constituted a distinctive mark
within the meaning of the Illinois Anti-Dilution Statute and that
the MAGIC POWDER container closely resembled it.324 The court
noted that the MAGIC POWDER bubble gum was a white powder
resembling cocaine. 325 Accordingly, the court held that sale of
MAGIC POWDER in a bottle with the same shape as Coca-Cola
would injure Coca-Cola's reputation, whether or not confusion took
3 26
place.
In American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Laboratories
Corp.,327 American Express sued over defendant's marketing of a
"condom card", a "credit" card with a condom attached to it, bearing the name AMERICA EXPRESS and slogan "Never leave home
without it." After finding confusion unlikely, the court found that
the defendant's use was likely to dilute plaintiff's "AMERICAN
EXPRESS" credit card mark and its slogan "Don't leave home
without it."3 28
B. Misrepresentation
In another credit card-related case, MasterCardInternational,
Inc. v. Arbel Corp.,329 Mastercard moved for summary judgment on
the defendant's 43(a) claim concerning the slogan "Master the
travel possibilities." Both parties provided travel related services,
but did not directly compete. The court denied summary judgment
because the plaintiff's good faith was in dispute. 330 The court also
recognized the possibility of reverse confusion ("that consumers
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1031-32.
323. 719 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1989).

324. Id. at 728.

325. Id.
326. Id.
327. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
328. Id. at 2013; see also Sage Realty Corp. v. Sage Group, Inc., 711 F. Supp.
134, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (suggesting good faith militates against a finding of
dilution).

329. 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1958 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
330. Id. at 1962.
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would be led to believe that the product or service of the senior
user, Arbel, emanated from or originated with the junior user, in
this case, MasterCard"), and stated that the defendant should be
331
given the chance to prove damages from such confusion.
In Monoflo Intl., Inc. v. Sahm,33 2 the defendant, a former purchaser of the plaintiff's collapsible plastic boxes, was accused under
section 43(a) of falsely representing to plaintiff's American distributor that it was plaintiff's exclusive European sales agent. The
plaintiff also alleged that the defendant misrepresented to plaintiff
that plaintiff breached various oral agreements with the defendant,
and had threatened criminal action to extort money.333 The court
held that the defendant's statements regarding its commercial relationship to plaintiff were not "false... representations" made "in
connection with any goods or services" so as to state a claim under
the Lanham Act. 334 The court also found a failure to state a claim
under the state unfair competition law as the alleged threats had to
335
be directed to customers.
In Rogers v. Grimaldi,336 Ginger Rogers brought suit under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and Oregon right of publicity law to
enjoin distribution of film entitled "Ginger and Fred." The film depicted the story of two fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated Rogers and Fred Astaire. The district court had granted
summary judgment for Grimaldi holding that First Amendment
concerns precluded application of the Lanham Act or right of pub33 7
licity law to movie titles.
The Second Circuit affirmed, but observed that the district
court's approach, in effect, insulated titles of artistic works from all
Lanham Acts claims. 338 The Second Circuit adopted a balancing
test, finding application of the Lanham Act to artistic works did not
violate the first amendment where the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion outweighed the public interest in free artistic
expression.3 3 9 For titles using a celebrity's name, the court held
that the balance weighed against applying the Lanham Act unless
the title had no artistic relevance to the underlying work or was
expressly misl.ading.3 40 Since the title at issue was artistically relevant to the content of the film and was not expressly misleading,
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. at 1963.
726 F. Supp. 121, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823 (E.D. Va. 1989).
Id. at 123.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 128.
695 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 120-21.
875 F.2d at 997.
Id. at 999.
Id.
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the Lanham Act interests were outwieghed by First Amendment
considerations. 341 The court also found that under the Oregon law
the right of publicity did not extend to the use of celebrity's name in
the title of a fictional work. 342
In two cases, alleged improper author attribution was at issue.
In Feerick v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 4 3 Feerick edited part of "The
Arthur Young Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions," but left the firm
before the book was completed. Feerick's introduction and chapter
were deleted, and he was not named as editor of the volume, but
was mentioned only in the acknowledgments. 344 Feerick sued to
enjoin publication, under a section 43(a), false attribution of editorial credit theory. 345 The court rejected this theory, noting that the
book had been substantially altered and that the acknowledgement
accurately described Feerick's contribution. 346 Summary judgment
347
was granted for the defendant.
In Goldsmith v. Main Line Book Co.,348 the plaintiff sued the
defendant for publishing an edited paperback edition of plaintiff's
book, "The Growth of Presidential Power, A Documented History."
The plaintiff alleged that in editing the paperback, the defendant's
attribution of the work to the plaintiff wrongfully misled the public. 3 4 9 The court held that the plaintiff's claim could withstand the
defendant's summary judgment motion. 3 °
C

False Advertising

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act also applies in false advertising actions. 351 Some courts previously limited its application to misrepresentations made about a party's own product. The Revision
Act now provides that misrepresentations about another's products
or services is actionable under section 43(a). 352 In ALPO Petfoods,
341. Id. at 1001.

342. Id. at 1000.
343. 715 F. Supp. 1234, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2021 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
344. Id. at 1235-36, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2021-22.

345. Id. at 1236, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2022.
346. Id.

347. Id. at 1237, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2022.
348. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

349. Id. at 1461.
350. Id.; see also Sunset Lamp Corp. v. Alsy Corp., 698 F. Supp 1146, 1153, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), later proceedings, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1571 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) and 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2051 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
where the Court held that the application of a false copyright notice to lamps
that infringed the plaintiff's original copyright constituted a false designation of
goods in violation of the Lanham Act.
351.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).

352. Id.
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Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.,3 3 two leading pet food firms sued each
other for false advertising. Alpo alleged that Ralston Purina advertised that its PUPPY CHOW prevented canine hip dysplasia, a malady primarily affecting large dogs.3m Ralston counterclaimed,
alleging that Alpo had claimed that its puppy food contained the
formula most preferred by veterinarians.3 55 The trial court found
both claims to be false. As to damages, the trial court adopted the
cost-of-advertising approach originated in U-Haul International,
Inc. v. Jartran,Inc.,356 awarding Alpo double the approximately
$5.2 that Ralston spent on advertising.357 The court refused to
award Ralston damages against Alpo because the court concluded
that Ralston was the greater wrongdoer. 35 8 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit vacated the judgment in favor of ALPO, reversed the award
of attorneys' fees and remanded the case for redetermination of
damages.

359

In Playskool, Inc. v. ProductDevelopment Group, Inc.,36 ° the
district court issued a preliminary injunction against the defendant's broad claim that its children's construction product "attached
to" the plaintiff's product. The claim, although true in limited circumstances, created a false impression as not all pieces were compatible nor were all connections safely made.36 1 As a remedy, in
addition to enjoining the claim, the court required a product
3 62
recall.
In Diversifed Marketing, Inc. v. Estee Lauder,Inc.,363 the defendant moved for summary judgment claiming that Diversified's
BEAUTY USA advertising slogan "If you like ESTEE
LAUDER.. .You'll love BEAUTY USA" diluted the defendant's famous mark for cosmetics and misappropriated defendant's good
will in violation of New York unfair competition law. The court
held that the plaintiff's campaign was permissible comparable advertising and that defendant's alleged injury was not the type
meant to be addressed by the anti-dilution statute as the defendant
had shown no whittling away of the distinctiveness of the ESTEE
353. 720 F. Supp 194, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1178 (D.D.C., 1989), aff'd in part,

rev'd in part, 913 F.2d 958 (C.A.FC. 1990).
354. Id. at 196, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
355. Id. at 196-97, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
356. 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
357. 720 F. Supp. 215, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195, aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 1913 F.2d 958 (C.A.F.C. 1990).
358. Id. at 216, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196.
359. 913 F.2d 958, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
360. 699 F. Supp 1056, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1712 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
361. Id. at 1060, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715.
362. Id. at 1063, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
363. 705 F. Supp. 128, 130, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882, 1882-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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3

LAUDER mark. 64
In ParamountPictures Corp. v. Video Broadcasting Systems,
Inc.,365 Paramount unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction
against the distribution of Paramount videotapes containing unauthorized commercials. The court found that there was no evidence
that the public perceived rented videotapes to contain only Paramount products. 36 6 Further, the court found it was reasonable to
infer that the defendants merely sought to seize the opportunity to
advertise goods to a captive audience, rather than intending to pass
off. 36 7 The court emphasized that the lack of actual confusion evidence was particularly probative given the novel nature of this type
of advertising. 368 Although defendant's advertisements in some instances overlapped or obliterated pre-recorded Pepsi commercials
and FBI warnings, the court also held that the addition of the defendant's advertisements did not alter, mutilate, edit or change the
motion picture recorded by Paramount in violation of section 43(a)
3 69
of the Lanham Act.
D.

Configurationand trade dress

Trade dress is protectable where it is non-functional and, if not
37 0
inherently distinctive, has acquired secondary meaning.
In Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc.,371 the Seventh
Circuit attempted to clarify its test for functionality. The defendant
had appealed a preliminary injunction entered against its use of an
exercise bike configuration, arguing in part that the configuration
was functional. 372 The Seventh Circuit vacated the order, holding
that the lower court had not analyzed the functionality issue
373
properly.
Conceding that at least one of its past decisions may have created confusion, the court reiterated the standard of W. Rogers
that "[a] feature is functional if it is one that is costly to design
'3 74
It
around or do without, rather than one that is costly to have.
364. Id. at 133-34, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
365. 724 F. Supp. 808 (D. Kan. 1989).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.; 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (1988).
370. See B. PArrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, supra note 24, at § 8.04 for a discussion of configuration and trade dress.
371. 870 F.2d 1176, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (7th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied,
No. 88-1575 (7th Cir. Mar. 24, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file).
372. Id. at 1188, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011.

373. Id. at 1190-91, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013-14.
374. Id. at 1189, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
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then clarified that trademark protection theoretically could be denied on the grounds of aesthetic functionality:
[i]t
was an error of law for the district court to ignore the 'pleasing'
aspects in determining the functionality of the overall design because
we have stated that attractiveness may, at some point, become functional: 'Though a producer does not lose a design trademark just because the publicfinds it to be pleasing, there may come a point where
the design feature is so important to the value of the product to consumers that continued trademark protection would deprive375
them of

competitive alternatives;and at that point protection ceases.'

In PlasticolorMolded Products v. Ford Motor Co.,376 the court
found Plasticolor's use of Ford's marks on its automotive floor mats
served both a trademark and a functional purpose, i.e., to show
one's allegiance to Ford, and thus, Plasticolor's products were
"mixed-use articles." The court held that established principles
were inapplicable to claims involving "mixed-use articles" because
total protection of the mark "defeats much of the feature's functionality," while denying any protection "would be decimating a
cause of action explicitly provided by Congress. '377 Thus, the court
stated, "We must look, therefore, for a solution that permits trademarks to be copied as functional features, but minimizes the likelihood the public will associate the copied mark with the
'378
registrant.
The court's solution was to require sufficient disclaimers at the
point-of-purchase to avoid likelihood of confusion, but to tolerate
some post-purchase confusion, by only requiring "all reasonable
steps to eliminate post-sale confusion. 3 79 The tolerance of postpurchase confusion was based on its conclusion that few customers
would be attracted to a "floor mat whose upper surface reads
"FORD (not authorized by Ford Motor Company). '380 After articulating its new standard for evaluating claims against "mixed-use articles," the court held that the evidence in the case was insufficient
381
for summary disposition on that issue.
In Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc.,382 the Fifth Circuit
upheld the lower court's finding that the plaintiff's design had not
achieved secondary meaning and that the design of the defendant's
medical cart was not confusingly similar to the plaintiff's medical
cart in light of the high degree of care exercised by hospitals in
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id. at 1191, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1013-14 (citations omitted).
713 F. Supp. 1329, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
Id. at 1337, 1338, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030, 1031.
Id. at 1339, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031.
Id., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
Id.
Id. at 1340, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032-33.
864 F.2d 1253, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (5th Cir. 1989).
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purchasing such products. Further, prominent labels identifying
a3
each manufacture helped to obviate any possible confusion.
Although the defendant was former distributor of the plaintiff, the
court found that the prior relationship between the parties did not
provide a basis for imposing a greater duty of the defendant to dis384
tinguish its goods.
Courts addressed two cases regarding the protectability of
lamps designs in 1989. In PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co.,-3 5 PAF
manufactured the DOVE, a high quality, Italian-designed desk
lamp which is the second-best selling model in the world and the
recipient of numerous accolades for its distinctive design. 38 6 The
defendants sold the SWAN, a low quality, Taiwanese imitation.
PAF sued for trade dress infringement under section 43(a).38 7 The
court held that the design of the lamp was not functional, noting
the existence of hundreds of other lamp configurations. 38 8 Secondary meaning was abundantly shown by sales figures, advertising
expenses, unsolicited media coverage, and evidence that defendant's
copying was intentional. 38 9 The court concluded that confusion was
likely, and held that the identification of the SWAN through hang
tags or an embossed logo would not prevent confusion.39° A permanent injunction was issued against the defendants, with profits and
3 91
attorneys' fees also awarded.
In Remcraft Lighting Products,Inc. v. Maxim Lighting,Inc.,392
the defendant moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's allegations that defendant had copied three lamp designs. Neither professionals nor defendant's own representatives could distinguish the
parties' products. In finding that a disputed issue of fact existed
over whether the overall appearance of the plaintiff's lighting fixtures was primarily nonfunctional, the court noted that it is not the
"shades, swivels or canopies which the plaintiff seeks to protect, but
the plaintiff's unique design of these elements. '393 A disputed issue of fact also was found to exist over whether the overall appearance of the plaintiff's lamps was inherently distinctive or had
394
acquired secondary meaning.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. at 1260, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
Id. at 1257-58, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-74.
712 F. Supp. 394, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 397-98, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
Id. at 397, 399, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163, 1165.
Id. at 401-02, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67.
Id. at 403, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1167-68.
Id. at 410, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
Id. at 412-14, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177-78.
706 F. Supp. 855, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1808 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
Id. at 857, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
Id. at 858-59, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810-11.
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In Time, Inc. v. Globe Communications Corp.,39 5 Time was

granted a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from
using elements of Time's PEOPLE magazine cover format in their
CELEBRITY PLUS magazine cover. The court held that specific
elements of the cover format, if considered separately, would be
functional, but the cover format as a whole was non-functional and
396
distinctive.
In Score, Inc. v. Cap Cities/ABC, Inc. 397 the court found that
the plaintiff's rights in an irreverent television sports trivia show
were not infringed by the defendant's television production. The
plaintiff's show featured a host who would ask questions about
sports personalities and events, sometimes showing film clips, and
awarding prizes to listeners who called in with the correct answers. 39 8 Plaintiff contended that the host's use of phrases such as
"Take a Hike" in response to a slow caller, or "Who's playing Time
Out for Trivia" were protectable, as were various other features of
the show, including red, white and blue bunting, sports logos and
399
the intermittent presentation of crowd noises.
The plaintiff's host left the show and joined defendant's "Monday Night Live" sports telecast which was not limited to trivia, but
also provided informational features. 400 In denying the plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction, the court found that the plaintiff would not be irreparably harmed as it had already altered its
show's format following the exit of its host. 40 1 The court further
found the show elements at issue were functional and had not de40 2
veloped a secondary meaning.
In L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.,40 3 L.A. Gear sued

Thom McAn for infringing the trade dress of its HOT SHOTS line
of athletic footwear consisting of an original configuration of mesh,
colored underlay, piping and a logo. The court held that while the
newness of the HOT SHOTS design militated against a finding of
secondary meaning, the defendant's intentional copying, the plaintiff's advertising expenditures and sales success, consumer surveys,
and unsolicited media coverage all supported protection of L.A.
395. 712 F. Supp. 1103, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (S.D.N.Y., 1989).
396. Id. at 407, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
397. 724 F. Supp. 194, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
398. Id. at 195, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
399. Id. at 196, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 198-99, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232-33.
402. Id. at 199-200, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234-35.
403. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), laterproceedings,No. 88 Civ.
6444 (RJW) (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); No. 88
Civ. 6444 (RJW) (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. File);
No. 88 Civ. 6444 (RJW) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist.
file).
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Gear's "secondary meaning in the making."" Likelihood of confusion was found to exist owing to the similarity of the products and
their distribution channels. 40 5 The court awarded an injunction
plus actual damages. 4° 6 In Warner Lambert Co. v. McCrory's
Corp.,4 ° 7 Warner-Lambert, maker of LISTERINE, moved unsuc-

cessfully for a preliminary injunction against McCrory's distribution of its own unflavored amber mouthwash in "bar-bell" type
waisted bottles. The court found the amber color functional and
the black cap unprotectable, but found the waisted bottle potentially protectable. 40 8 In denying the motion, however, the court relied on McCrory's evidence that a number of chains had marketed
products in similar trade dress for at least six years with the
Warner Lambert's acquiescence, Warner Lambert's seven month
delay in bringing suit, and the fact that the LISTERINE bottles are
4° 9
ordinarily sold inside a paper wrapper.
404. Id. at 1011.
405. Id. at 1012-13.

406. Id. at 1014 (the court denied the plaintiff enhanced damages).
407. 718 F. Supp. 389, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1884 (D.N.J. 1989).
408. Id. at 396, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1889-90.
409. Id. at 394, 399, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888, 1891-92. Other trade dress
and configuration cases of interest include the following: In Clamps Mfg. Co. v.
Enco Mfg. Co, 870 F.2d 512, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 202 (1989), the appellate court affirmed a ruling that the plaintiff's rights in its KANT-TWIST cantilevered clamp configuration were
infringed even though the defendant labeled its product with its own name,
finding plaintiff's configuration had acquired secondary meaning due to being
prominently featured in plaintiff's advertising and promotional efforts.
In Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1522 (D.C. Cal. 1988), 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1522 (C.D. Cal. 1988), the court held
that the overall external configuration of the plaintiff's pistol was non-functional. Noting the availability of many alternative designs, the court held that
the plaintiff's particular combination of features was "not necessary to the
functioning of the gun," and therefore was entitled to trademark protection
under § 43(a). Id. at 1528-29.
In White Swan Ltd. v. Clyde Robin Seed Co., 729 F. Supp. 1257, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985 (N.D.Cal. 1989), the parties both sold flower seeds packaged in shaker-top cans. The plaintiff claimed rights in the overall combination
of the can, company names, logos, color schemes and word trademarks. The
court denied defendant's summary judgment motion that the plaintiff's trade
dress was functional, or lacked secondary meaning since it was only two years
old. Id. at 1261-62. Evidence of actual confusion, evidence of the defendant's
bad intent and other factors demonstrated that a trial was warranted, even
though the court had earlier denied a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1262-63.
In Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1740 (9th Cir. 1989), Melville brought out a line of sportswear similar in style to
Vision's, under the label STREET CLOSED. It then altered the configuration
of this label so as to resemble Vision's VISION STREET WEAR label. Id. at
611, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741. The logos were also printed prominently on
the clothing itself in some cases. The court of appeals upheld the lower court's
finding that the VISION STREET WEAR logo was not functional and had ac-
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Misappropriation

Misappropriation theory posits that intangible things such as
ideas, information, formulas, designs, and artistic creations may 4be
10

protectable as "quasi-property" under appropriate circumstances.
It was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in the still controver4 11
sial International News Service v. Associated Press case.
Although rejected by some courts as federal common law obviated
by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 412 the doctrine has shown new vitality
in recent years.
In Koret, Inc. v. R.JR Nabisco, Inc.,413 Koret claimed to have
created the idea of marketing cigarettes under a designer label, and
to have brokered a deal between RJR and Yves Saint Laurent,
both of whom allegedly misappropriated the idea. Koret also
claimed that RJR violated an express agreement to compensate it
for its efforts. 414 By Koret's own admission, the idea was not novel
and therefore could not be the subject of a successful misappropriaquired secondary meaning, and confusion was likely. Id. at 613-17, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743-45.
See also Bloomfield Indus. v. Stewart Sandwiches, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 380, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (N.D.Ind. 1989) (defendant unsuccessfully moved for
summary judgment that it was not infringing the plaintiff's coffee maker trade
dress, the court finding genuine issues of fact as to whether a secondary meaning had developed through plaintiff's promotion and whether confusion was
likely as it was unclear whether all of the defendant's coffee makers were labeled and how sophisticated the purchasers were); Sun Products Group, Inc. v.
B & E Sales Co., 700 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (defendant infringed plaintiff's distinctive trade dress for its foldable head rest, the court noting defendant even pictured plaintiff's product on defendant's packaging); Second Earth
Enter., Inc. v. Allstar Prod. Mktg. Co., 717 F. Supp. 302, 307 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (the
use of the prismatic foil on disposable lighters was held functional because it "is
directly related to the commercial success of the product and therefore is not
used solely for the purpose of identification. The use of the prismatic foil allows
a wrapped lighter to be sold for much more than the price of an unwrapped
lighter, dramatically increasing the profit margin." Moreover, "the prismatic
foil is related to the utilitarian function of the product," namely causing the
wrapped lighter to light up); Car-Freshener Corp. v. Scentex, Inc., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d 1361 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (while the defendant had been sued previously
for infringement of plaintiff's CAR FRESHNER mark, there was only minimal
evidence of bad faith in this instance, and its current automobile air freshener
design was only slightly reminiscent of plaintiff's pine tree and the packaging
of the two products was quite distinct warranting a denial of plaintiff's preliminary injunction motion).
410. See B. PATTISHALL & D. HILUARD, supra note 24, at § 8.03 for a discussion of misappropriation.
411. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
412. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American
Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co., 124 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
682 (1942).
413. 702 F. Supp. 412, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), qff'd per
curiam, 875 F.2d 307, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (2d Cir. 1989) (not for
publication).
414. Id. at 413, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
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tion claim. 41 5 The court also held that, in the absence of a written
agreement, no action for fraud or breach of contract could be
41 6
maintained.
F. Right of publicity
The right of publicity has been defined as "the right of an individual, especially a public figure or celebrity, to control the commercial value and exploitation of his name and picture or likeness
and to prevent others from unfairly appropriating this value for
their commercial benefit. '41 7 It is an offshoot from the law of privacy, under which protection may be had for such things as a person's feelings and private affairs.
In Pirone v. MacMillian, Inc.,418 the plaintiff, an heir to Babe
Ruth, and the owner of the registered trademark BABE RUTH for
playing cards, writing paper, envelopes and other goods, sued the
defendant under the Lanham Act and right of publicity law for its
use of three photographs of Ruth on the cover and interior of its
engagement calendar. The court granted the defendant summary
judgment. 41 9 The plaintiff had not established through use or registration a trademark in any photograph resembling defendant's
photos. 420 The photographs of Ruth, furthermore, were not used on
the calendar to identify source, but merely to identify one of many
baseball players shown.4 2 1 The court further held that in New
York the common law right of publicity was superceded by the New
York Civil Rights Law, and that an individual's statutory right did
422
not descend to his heirs.
In Nurmi v. Peterson,423 the creator of VAMPIRA, a 1950's horror movie hostess and television character brought suit against the
creator of ELVIRA, a similar horror movie hostess and TV character being portrayed today, based on California Civil Code section
3344, which prohibits unauthorized use of another's "likeness," and
on common law right of publicity. The district court dismissed the
section 3344 claim because under section 3344, "likeness" meant an
exact copy of another's features and not merely a suggestive resem424
blance as was found to exist between VAMPIRA and ELVIRA.
415. Id. at 414, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
416. Id. at 414-15, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472-73.
417. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981).
418. No. 88 Civ. 3173 (PNL) (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1989) (Lexis Genfed library,
Dist file), aff'd, No. 89-7750 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1990).
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.

422. Id.
423. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989).

424. Id. at 1777.
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The court also dismissed the plaintiff's right to publicity claim because it did not allege that Vampira's actual features were used for
commercial purposes, but only that defendant had created a new
425
character that resembled VAMPIRA.
G.

Passingoff

In Roho, Inc. v. Marquis,42 6 the defendant used wheelchair
cushions bearing the plaintiff's trademark ROHO to make mattresses for sale to hospitals. In grating a preliminary injunction, the
court accepted the plaintiff's "reverse palming off" theory that "by
obliterating its 'ROHO' trademarks and patent information from
the bottom of the cushions and placing its own label on the cushions, Marquis is expropriating Roho's products in a way that is
likely to cause consumers to be confused as to the product's
' 42 7

origins."

In Blinded Veterans Association v. Blinded American Veterans
Foundation,42s the district court had found that defendant BAVF
had infringed BVA's trademark, BAV, and enjoined BAVF "from
using the name 'Blinded American Veterans Foundation,' the initials 'BAV' or 'BAVF,' and any name in which the words 'veterans'
and 'blind' or 'blinded' appear as noun and modifying adjective."
The appellate court found the term "blinded veterans" is generic and unprotectable, stating "[i]t is difficult to imagine another
term of reasonable conciseness and clarity by which the public refers to former members of the armed forces who have lost their
vision." 429 However, the court found that BVA might upon remand
be able to prove "passing off."'430 To succeed on this claim "BVA
must prove that the likely effect of BAVF's actions is to induce the
public to think that BAVF is BVA. ''43 ' It suggested a prominent
432
disclaimer as a remedy if passing off were found.
H.

State business and consumer protection acts

In Nash v. CBS Inc.,433 the plaintiff alleged copyright infringement and state law claims based upon defendant's alleged infringe425. Id. at 1778.
426. 717 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. La. 1989), vacated, 902 F.2d 356, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1057 (5th Cir. 1990).
427. Id. at 1175.
428. 872 F.2d 1035, 1036, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
429. Id. at 1041, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
430. Id. at 1047, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
431. Id. at 1046, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
432. Id. at 1047, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
433. 704 F. Supp. 823, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 899
F.2d 1537, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (7th Cir. 1990), later proceedings, 750 F.
Supp. 328 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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ment of plaintiff's John Dillinger story. Defendant's motion for
summary judgment was granted on the copyright claims.434 Summary judgment was denied on the state statutory law claims, on the
grounds that the Copyright Act does not preempt claims under Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, since UDTPA's goal
of consumer protection from deception renders it sufficiently "different" from Copyright Act so as to avoid pre-emption. 435 The
court did find the author's common law claim for misappropriation
4
was pre-empted. 3
437
In Cinema Concepts Theatre Service Co. v. Filmack Studios,
the court held that section 262 of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 438 authorizes a remedy only when
the defendant's conduct injured consumers generally or affected
competition in the marketplace. Indirect injury to consumers was
held insufficient to convey standing to a competitor. 439 Under paragraph 312 of that Act, the court noted that a statement of opinion of
comparable or better quality in comparison with a competitor's
product is neither actionable nor conduct likely to cause confusion
or misunderstanding. 44 °
In Hospitality International,Inc. v. Northway Inn Corp.,441 the
plaintiff sued for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act
and the New York trademark statute. The defendant moved to dismiss the state law claim because plaintiff never registered its mark
in New York.442 The court declined to dismiss the state law count,
holding that registration is not necessary to state a claim under the
443
New York statute.
VIII.

JURISDICTION AND REMEDIES

A.
1.

Jurisdiction

Subject matterjurisdiction

An initial hurdle for any litigant is establishing that the court
has subject matter jurisdiction.
In Reebok International,Ltd. v. American Sales Corp.,4" the
434.
435.
436.
437.
1990).
438.

Id. at 831, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
Id. at 833, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
Id. at 835, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035-36.
11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564 (N.D.Ill. 1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, para. 262 (1987).

439. Cinema Concepts Theater Serv.
440.
441.
442.
443.

Co., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.

Id. at 1566-67.
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1239.

444. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229 (C.D.Cal. 1989).
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defendant transported allegedly counterfeit REEBOK products
through a foreign trade zone in the U.S., without entering customs,
and also sold them abroad. In upholding subject matter jurisdiction,
the court stated that the Lanham Act has a broad jurisdictional
grant that extends to foreign trade zones. 445 It found that the
purchase of the products, with letters of credit from within its district, arranged by the defendant within the district, and the fact
that the shoes were offered for sale to buyers in the U.S. also con446
tributed to the grant of subject matter jurisdiction.
In Fitzgerald v. J & R Chicken & Ribs, Inc. ,447 a non-diversity
infringement action over the mark CHICKEN HOLIDAY for takeout chicken restaurants, the court found a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The court stated that plaintiff "has failed to allege any
facts which could show that either his business or that of J&R has
any connection to interstate commerce. On the contrary, plaintiff
appears to acknowledge that both his take-out chicken business as
well as that of the alleged infringer, J&R, are local in nature ....,,448
In Calvin Klein Industries,Inc. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd.,449 the
plaintiff had rejected defective CALVIN KLEIN sportswear manufactured by defendant. The court granted an injunction prohibiting
defendant from selling the rejected sportswear anywhere in the
world where the plaintiff had a presence. 450 The court based its
jurisdiction for this broad order on the effect defendant's sales
would have on U.S. commerce. 4 51 Specifically, such sales by defendant would undermine exclusive rights of plaintiff's licensees
and would undermine plaintiff's goodwill and reputation because
the defendant's goods were inferior.452 Further, jurisdiction was
proper because the injunction did not encroach upon any foreign
trademark law. 453 Finally, defendant was incorporated in New
4 4
York and the original contract was signed there. 5
Federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over Lanham
Act claims. In Scientific Technology, Inc. v. Stanford Telecommunications, Inc.,455 the court remanded back to state court a trademark suit originally brought under state law, which had been
445. Id. at 1230-31.
446. Id. at 1231.
447. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384 (D.N.J. 1989).
448. Id. at 1386.
449. 714 F. Supp. 78, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1730 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
450. Id. at 80, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1732.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 78, 80, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731, 1732.
455. 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566 (N.D. Cal. 1988), mandamus granted, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1989).
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removed by defendant after plaintiff amended its complaint to include a Lanham Act cause of action.
Appellate jurisdiction over non-final orders was at issue in
Copelands' Enterprises,Inc. v. CNV, Inc.,4 M where the Board had
granted partial summary judgment in favor of CNV on the issue of
whether CNV misused the registration symbol. Copelands appealed to the Federal Circuit, and CNV moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction on the grounds that the Board decision was non-final,
45 7
interlocutory and non-appealable.
Although the statutory provision outlining the jurisdiction of
the Federal Circuit, 4 s does not expressly require finality, the court
recognized that its predecessor court, the Court of Customs, and
Patent Appeals had regularly held finality a prerequisite to appeal.
Further, the court noted that both the C.C.P.A. and the Federal
Circuit have allowed appeal from a non-final decision where the effect of the lower court's interlocutory order was "fundamental to
the further conduct of the case" under the test set forth in Gillespie
v. United States Steel Corp.459 The court, however, stated that Gillespie was subsequently limited to its "unique facts" involving
wrongful death and that similar facts could not possibly arise before
the Board. 460 In dismissing Copelands' appeal, the Federal Circuit
held that Gillespie no longer provides a jurisdictional basis to hear
discretionary appeals from interlocutory T.T.A.B. decisions or
46 1
orders.
2. PersonalJurisdiction
Sales of infringing product in a judicial district may constitute
the minimum contacts necessary to establish personal jurisdiction
and may also be sufficient to establish venue in appropriate cases
under the "where the claim arose" provision of the federal venue
462
statute.
463
In Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. American Suzuki Motor Corp.,
Swift owned the registered mark SWIFT for food products, and
sued Suzuki for using the same mark on cars. Defendant Murphy,
an Illinois resident, was one among defendant's many authorized
dealers nationwide, and had only sold three trucks under the
456. 887 F.2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
457. Id. at 1067.
458. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988).
459. Copeland'sEnters. Inc., 887 F.2d at 1068; see Gillespie v. United States
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964), overruled by, 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
460. Copeland'sEnters. Inc., 887 F.2d at 1068.
461. Id.
462. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (b) (1988).

463. No. 89-C-0392 (E.D. Ill. June 10, 1989) (Lexis, Patcop library, cases file).
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mark.'
The court dismissed Murphy as a party because he had
"no role in the selection, adoption and use of the 'SWIFT' trademark," and had been selected merely to prevent a transfer of
venue.465 The claim against Suzuki arose in the Central District of
California, because all the pertinent decisions and actions and 24%
of the sales, as opposed to 3% in Illinois, were made there. 46 In
deciding to transfer venue there, the court also emphasized that
most of the defendant's principal witnesses and its records were lo467
cated there.
The court issued a remarkable sanction in Curtis Management
Group, Inc. v. Academy of Motion PictureArts & Sciences.46 8 The
plaintiff represented James Dean's heirs. The defendant over a
three year span had sold James Dean posters to a New York distributor who then arranged for their sale in Indiana.469 More than
1,600 posters, half of them of James Dean, were sold in Indiana during that time. The court found that these were insufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction in Indiana, as they failed to
demonstrate "a continuous and systematic presence by the Academy in Indiana. ' 470 Nor was there any indication defendant knew
47 1
or should have known that its posters would be sold in Indiana.
Venue was also improper; the infringement claim did not arise
there since the posters were neither made there nor directly sold
there by defendant. 472 Nonetheless, the court found that affidavits
filed by the defendants erroneously admitting only 61 poster sales
in Indiana warranted Rule 11 sanctions because of the delay and
expense they caused. 473 In an extremely unusual holding, the court
penalized defendant by striking its motion to dismiss and allowing
the action to take place in the Southern District of Indiana even
474
though there was no personal jurisdiction or proper venue.
In Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Grist Mill Co. ,475 Lipton claimed
that its FUN FRUITS trade dress for fruit snacks was infringed by
defendant. Defendant, a Delaware company with its principal place
of business in Minnesota, moved to dismiss for a lack of personal
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.

467. Id.
468. 717 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D.Ind. 1989).
469. Id. at 1366.
470. Id. at 1367.
471. Id. at 1371.
472. Id. at 1372.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 1373-74.
475. No. 88-4190 (D.N.J. June 5, 1989)(LEXIS, Patcop library, cases file) (not
for publication).
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jurisdiction and improper venue. 476 Defendant's use of a business
office in New Jersey having an employee and office telephone
number, and the use of food brokers in the state, constituted sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. 477 The court
found venue proper deferring to plaintiff's choice of forum since
478
the claim could have arisen in a number of different locations.
4 79
Applying Leroy v. Western United Corp., the court found that
the plaintiff would suffer as much hardship in having its witnesses
go to Minnesota as defendants would in having witnesses come to
New Jersey.480 The court found that venue was also proper under
the doing business test, equating doing business with amenability to
481
personal jurisdiction.
3.

Venue

Venue in a case where jurisdiction is not based soley upon diversity is proper where either the claim arose or where defendant
resides. 4s 2 The venue statute was amended in 1988 to define corporate residency to exist where the corporation is subject to personal
48 3
jurisdiction.
In Universal Manufacturing Company v. Douglas Press,
Inc.,4s4 a trademark dispute over gaming materials was dismissed
for improper venue because the defendant had "no offices, employees, telephone listings, property or bank accounts in Missouri; less
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. 443 U.S. 173, 185 (1979).
480. GristMill Co., No. 88-4190 (D.N.J. June 5, 1989) (LEXIS, Patcop library,
Cases file)(not for publication).
481. Id. In Good 'N Natural v. Nature's Bounty, Inc., No. 87-662 (D.N.J. 'July
12, 1989) (Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file) (not for publication), the court determined that there was personal jurisdiction for all three counterclaim defendants in this infringement suit over the mark GOOD'N NATURAL for health
related goods. The court cited the delivery of goods and advertising as sufficient
minimum contacts for one counterclaim defendant. Id. The court found that
another's role in directing the sale of goods in New Jersey and in incorporating
a mail order business for selling the allegedly infringing goods there established
personal jurisdiction. Id.
In Quality Inns Intl., Inc. v. Rock Springs Lodging Assoc., No. HAR 88-326
(D.Md. Jan. 9, 1989)(Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file), the court found that the
defendant, a Wyoming partnership, was subject to jurisdiction in Maryland for
allegedly infringing the plaintiff's QUALITY INN mark following termination
of the defendant's franchise agreement. Following Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), the, court held that negotiations with the Maryland franchisor and continued contact with the plaintiff through the franchise
were sufficient to establish jurisdiction in Maryland. Id.
482. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1988).
483. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 1367(b), 102 Stat. 4646 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1989)).
484. No. 88-1066-CV-W-1 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
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than 2% of defendant's sales [we]re distributed to companies located in Missouri... [and] [aIll of defendant's facilities, employees
and records [we]re located in Illinois. All purchase orders [we]re
accepted in Illinois. ' 48 5 The only connection with Missouri was defendant's limited Bingo tax license and a single shipment of goods.
The court determined that these contacts were insufficient to constitute "doing business" and transferred the case to the Northern
486
district of Illinois.
4. Standing
In Dovenmuehle v. Gilidorn Mortgage Midwest Corp.,48 7 the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that plaintiffs,
members of family surnamed "Dovenmuehle," lacked standing
under section 43(a) to challenge defendant's use of the trade name
"Dovenmuehle." The Seventh Circuit found that plaintiffs failed to
show any interest in the trade name after the sale of their family
business. 48 8 Plaintiffs' emotional desire to prevent others from using the trade name, furthermore, did not create an interest giving
48 9
rise to Lanham Act standing.
485. Id.
486. Id. In Weight Watchers Intl., Inc. v. Stouffers Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1544 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), although Stouffers was in the process of ending its
business in New York, the court ruled that venue was proper because the defendant was licensed to do business there at the time of the lawsuit. Intent to
cease doing business was held irrelevant. Id. at 1546; see also Powell Corp. v.
Fun Wear, Inc., No. CV 89-0835 (SVW) (C.D. Cal. April 14, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file), 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (company
"doing business" for purposes of venue where it attends trade shows and solicits
business); Harris Moran Seed Company v. Moreton Seeds Inc., 88 Civ. 2006
(PKL) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1989) (Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file) (venue transferred to Western District where conduct underlying the claim occurred); Creative Structures, Inc. v. Contemporary Systems, Inc., No. 88-7373 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 3,
1989) (Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file) (sending of cease and desist letters into
forum insufficient to provide basis for venue).
487. 871 F.2d 697, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550 (7th Cir. 1989).
488. Id. at 701, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
489. Id. In Staff Builders of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Ephraim Koschitzki, No.
88-6103 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 18, 1989) (Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file), the plaintiffs,
licensees of the defendant, sued under the Lanham Act to cancel the defendant's supplemental registration of STAFF BUILDERS for temporary services
businesses, and for an injunction in six counties in Pennsylvania to prevent further licensing of the mark by the defendant. Since the plaintiffs' trademark
rights were derivative of defendant's, the court held that the plaintiffs' claim
was essentially for breach of contract, not for infringement, and dismissed it.
Id.
In Shima Am. Corp. v. S.M. Arnold, Inc., No. 88 C 10064 (E.D.Ill. June 5,
1989) (Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file), plaintiff was assigned an Illinois registration for a distinctive cover for a moisture absorbent drying sponge. The
court found the assignor was not a necessary party, as defendant asserted, since
.the assignment was valid, despite limitations such as reversion on a condition
subsequent. Id.
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B Remedies
The Revision Act provides that all remedies available to a registrant for trademark infringement are also available to a claimant
49
for misrepresentation under section 43(a). 0
1.

Injunctions

In Boston Athletic Assn. v. Sullivan,491 plaintiff sought an injunction against an ex-licensee's use of the words BOSTON MARATHON, with a picture of a runner and the year on T-shirts. The
district court, affirmed by the First Circuit, had denied preliminary
injunctive relief, finding no irreparable harm because of the annual
and discrete nature of the harm, the availability of damages and the
late date at which the plaintiff's instituted suit in federal court. 492
On appeal from a subsequent summary judgment for defendant, the
First Circuit reversed and ruled that defendant should be permanently enjoined from using the words BOSTON MARATHON on
493
T-shirts.
In Fishing Hot Spots, Inc. v. Simon & Schuster,494 the court
interpreted its Lanham Act authority to grant preliminary injunctions as independent and not limited by Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in rejecting the defendant's argument that
the court was bound by Rule 65(c) to provide security. The court
495
nonetheless ordered the plaintiff to post a bond.

In El Greco Leather ProductsCo. v. Shoe World,496 the plaintiff
owned the registered trademark CANDIES for shoes, and had rejected an order of shoes bearing the mark. The defendant, also a
shoe company, then bought and sold the rejected shipment. The
Second Circuit had decided in an earlier proceeding that defendant
was selling counterfeit goods because they were sold without plaintiff's permission or knowledge. 497 In this proceeding, the court considered appropriate remedies and determined that an injunction
satisfied the equities of the case.498 It rejected plaintiff's damages
plea because of defendant's good faith, emphasizing that the district
court originally found no Lanham Act violation before being re490. Cf. Knorr-Nahrmittel A.G. v. Reese Finer Foods, 695 F. Supp. 787
(D.N.J. 1988) (finding attorneys' fees available under § 43(a)).
491. 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989).
492. Id. at 26.
493. Id. at 35.
494. 720 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
495. Id. at 748; see also Slazengers Ltd. v. Stoller, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2007
(N.D. Ill.
1989) (15 U.S.C. § 1116 an independent grant of injunctive authority
not limited by Rule 65, F.R.C.P.).
496. 726 F. Supp. 25, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534 (E.D. N.Y. 1989).
497. Id. at 26, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
498. Id.
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versed. 499 There also was no unjust enrichment because defendant
had no knowledge of the non-genuine character of the shoes. 5° °
Nor was the plaintiff's goodwill damaged as plaintiff had not rejected the shoes on quality grounds.501
In Money Store, Inc. v. HarriscorpFinance Inc.,5°2 The Money
Store moved to modify a previously granted injunction, preventing
it from marketing its lending services under the mark THE
MONEY STORE within the Chicago metropolitan area. It claimed
that in the intervening 5 years local user Harriscorp had so reduced
its use of THE MONEY STORE as to no longer warrant such broad
protection.5° 3 The court declined to modify the injunction, holding
that Harriscorp's use remained extensive, and that the extent of its
use should be measured in absolute terms rather than relative to its
5 °4
prior use.
2. Contempt
Manhattan Industries, Inc. v. Sweater Bee By Banff, Ltd.,505
arose out of the 1981 consent judgment permitting each party to use
the KIMBERLY mark in connection with women's apparel, but
only when accompanied by a "source reference," e.g. KIMBERLY
BY SWEATER BEE and KIMBERLY BY BAYARD. The district
court held Manhattan in civil contempt for failing to so distinguish
its goods, but declined to award compensatory sanctions because
Sweater Bee had not shown willfulness, any loss of sales or profits,
or other economic harm. 5° 6 The Second Circuit again noted that
contempt sanctions can be imposed without a finding of willfulness.50 7 Furthermore, a contempt plaintiff may be entitled to the
defendant's profits without direct proof of injury under an unjust
enrichment theory. 5°8 Since Manhattan did not have the right to
sell KIMBERLY goods, but only KIMBERLY BY BAYARD goods,
the court found that all profits derived from the sale of goods without the source reference constituted unjust enrichment.5 0 9 Sweater
Bee therefore was entitled to contempt sanctions in an amount
equal to Manhattan's net profits for the period of the contempt,
499. Id. at 27, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
500. Id. at 30, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1538.
501. Id. at 31, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539.

502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.

885 F.2d 369, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1282 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 373, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285.
Id. at 373, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286.
885 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1447 (1990).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
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which totalled over $147,000.510
In Soft Sheen Products, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc.,511 the court held
that an "[i]njunction that prohibited trade dress infringement defendant from using trade dress that is 'confusingly similar' to plaintiff's defined trade dress is sufficiently specific to provide fair notice
of prohibited conduct, and defendant's hair care product which
utilizes trade dress that is identical to plaintiff's except for color of
jar top is 'confusingly similar' and warrants finding of contempt."
The court recommended that Revlon submit any proposed products
that might arguably fall within the scope of the injunction to Soft
5 12
Sheen's counsel prior to their introduction into the market place.
If the parties determined that a genuine dispute existed as to the
proposed product, Revlon was directed to petition the court for a
513
construction of the injunction order.
3. Damages
In William Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Waters,5 14 plaintiff obtained a
$135,000 judgment against defendants, former trademark agents of
plaintiff, for negligent performance of services and breach of contract. The defendants had billed Wrigley one lump sum for services
rendered in maintaining foreign registrations, including retaining
foreign law firms and paying them for their services. 515 When
Wrigley terminated its arrangement with the defendants, it learned
510. Id. at 7-8.
511. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1702 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
512. Id. at 1703.
513. Id In Girls Clubs of America, Inc. v. Boys Clubs of America, Inc., 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), No. 81 Civ. 0093 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. July
23, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); No. 81 Civ. 0093 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y.
Sept 17, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); No. 81 Civ. 0093 (CSH)
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 1, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); No. 81 Civ. 0093
(CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file), the defendant had been preliminarily enjoined from changing its name from BOYS
CLUBS OF AMERICA to BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS OF AMERICA. The
court then held that the defendant had not committed contempt by issuing an
annual meeting notice proposing a vote on changing the name to BOYS AND
GIRLS CLUBS USA. Id. at 1529. It nevertheless granted injunctive relief to
delay the vote pending completion of trial of the trademark infringement action. Id.
In Canterbury Belts Ltd. v. Lane Walker Rudkin, Ltd., 869 F.2d 34, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (2d Cir. 1989), the plaintiff alleged violations of a consent decree which prohibited the defendant from using the term CANTERBURY except as part of the composite CANTERBURY OF NEW ZEALAND,
with all elements being displayed in substantially equal prominence. The district court found no violation of the terms of the consent decree. Id. at 35-36; 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991. Reversing and remanding, the Second Circuit held
that the history of the consent decree's negotiation could be considered in interpreting the decree's language, and that sanctions for civil contempt could be
imposed without a finding of willfulness. Id. at 38, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993.
514. 890 F.2d 594, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125 (2d Cir. 1989).
515. Id. at 596, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
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that some of the foreign associates hired by defendant had not been
paid. 516 The court ordered the amount due be paid to Wrigley and
imposed a constructive trust requiring Wrigley to distribute the
funds as appropriate. 51 7 The court also awarded Wrigley over
$55,000 in "clean up" costs, namely, reviewing and reconstructing
the trademark files that defendants had mismanaged.5 1 8 The Second Circuit upheld the lower court's assessment of damages and use
of a constructive trust to achieve orderly payment to the foreign
law firms. 519 Although the court could have imposed a constructive
trust on the defendants, the court upheld the lower court's method
5 20
as sound and clearly within the law.
4. Punitive damages
Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transportation Corp.,521 in-

volved an award of compensatory and punitive damages against the
defendants arising out of the sale of "non-Getty" gasoline to
GETTY franchised service stations for resale under the GETTY
trademark. The court noted its earlier decision in Getty Petroleum
Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp.,522 that the Lanham Act does not
authorize punitive damages awards, but nevertheless sustained the
punitive award ($250,000) under New York law.5 23 Since a reasonably prudent consumer driving up to a GETTY pump would believe
it was getting GETTY gas, actual confusion and a "wrong... aggra52 4
vated by recklessness or willfulness" logically followed.
5. Interest
In Gorenstein EnterprsesInc. v. Quality Care-USA Inc.,525 the
Seventh Circuit upheld the award of treble damages, plus attorney
fees and compound prejudgment interest, against an ex-franchisee
who continued using the QUALITY CARE trademark after termination of the franchise. Noting the absence of any reference to prejudgment interest in the Lanham Act, the court, nonetheless, held
that prejudgment interest should be presumptively available to victims of federal law violations, since without it, plaintiff's compensa516.
517.
518.
519.

Id.
Id. at 597-98, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
Id. at 597, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
Id. at 600, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.

520. Id.
521. 878 F.2d 650, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334 (2d Cir. 1989).
522. 858 F.2d 103, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1336 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490
U.S. 1006 (1989).
523. Island Transp. Corp., 878 F.2d at 657, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
524. Id.
525. 874 F.2d 431, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762 (7th Cir. 1989).
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tion is incomplete and the defendant has an incentive to delay. 526
6. Attorneys'fees
In TakeCare Corp. v. Takecare of Oklahoma Inc.,527 the plaintiff, a health maintenance organization, obtained a permanent injunction against the defendant's use of the mark TAKECARE for
its HMO services. The defendant challenged the district court's
award of attorney's fees, claiming that this was not an "exceptional
case" because the defendant's actions were taken on the advice of
counsel. 528 The Court of Appeals refused to rescind the award, stating that the defendant had failed to prove that its reliance had been
529
reasonable.
CONCLUSION

Overall, the decisions in the year preceeding the 34th Annual
Conference sound themes common to years past. There were continuing developments of significance in the areas of gray market,
dilution, parody and trade dress, with some key decisions involving
licensor liability, trademark functionality and false advertising.
Chief among the common themes is that trademark infringement
and unfair competition are torts of deceit. The judicial perception
of bad intent often plays a decisive role in determining the infringement of rights. In looking forward, changes to the Lanham Act involving bona fide intent and bona fide use are likely to increase
judicial focus on intent as an element affecting the creation of
rights as well.

526.
527.
528.
529.

Id. at 436, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764-65.
889 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 956-57.
Id. at 957-58.

